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Abstract
This project analyzes the Russian colonization of Turkestan in the second half of the
nineteenth century. Specific attention is given to a group of Russian bureaucrats and military
personnel who sought to reform the Tsar‘s administration of the region. By outlining the debate
surrounding economic and political reform, as well as the controversy circulating around Russian
ethnographic practice, this project discusses the myriad ways in which the local population of
Turkestan negotiated new forms of anti-colonial resistance within their rapidly changing social
environment.
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Introduction
Previously ruled by different Khans, Emirs, and nomadic herdsmen, the people of
Turkestan experienced a massive transformation of their political, social, and economic life in
the mid-nineteenth century. While the leader of Bukhara and Khiva remained nominally intact,
others in Turkestan suddenly found themselves under the control of a Tsar who ruled them from
over two thousand miles north-west of their land, who did not speak a word of their language,
and who was not Muslim. At home, former enemies were asked to become ―fellow countrymen.‖
Turkoman raiders were expected to live next to Sart traders; slaves, next to their former masters;
and the Kokanese next to the Bukharans. This was possible only if the inhabitants of Turkestan
considered themselves ―Turkestanis.‖
To the Russians, this meant extirpating what they perceived to be the region‘s pervasive
inter-tribal violence and pre-modern Islamic fanaticism. From a tabula rasa they would construct
a society of civic-minded Imperial citizens dedicated to the advancement of Russian
grazhdanstvennost’ (civilization). But the removal of Islam would require force, and lots of it.
As the Russians learned in the Caucasus, this situation was not ideal. More so, the state treasury
was drained. A defeat in the Crimean War had sapped resources, rendering the Empire uneager
for a drawn-out campaign in Turkestan. The Russian government conquered Turkestan, but it
was unwilling to continue the aggressive into the private sphere: further bloodshed engendered
by a prolonged battle against Islam and local culture was not on the Tsar‘s agenda.
Modernization and colonization of the region would have to happen over time.
But why would an aggressive policy of modernization be attractive in the first place?
Turkestan was an arid stretch of land of dubious economic import. Consequently, the territory
was at best an afterthought for Russia‘s burgeoning bourgeoisie. It was the lucrative western
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provinces, not the scattered oases of the Kara Kum, which garnered the attention of Russian
entrepreneurs. Turkestan was also isolated. Politically, the Empire was indifferent. While Peter
the Great made military forays into Turkestan in an attempt to secure a passage to India, the
Russian politicians of the nineteenth century probably did not have this in mind. As the Empire
stretched farther and farther south, Turkestan became the site of the ―Great Game‖ between the
British and the Russians. But Turkestan was more than just a pawn in the power politics of the
two super-powers. It was a colony that the Russians sought to develop and exploit. The ―Great
Game‖ argument cannot alone explain the expenditures that went into Turkestan‘s incorporation
and subsequent development. Additionally, Turkestan was far beyond the peripheries of a
―primordial‖ Russian homeland. The logic of recuperating a lost ethnic territory would not hold
in Turkestan. Russophile champions of Russian expansion would have no truck with Turkestan,
and Russifying politicians had little to say about the region. They viewed the population as
irreparably alien, incapable of adopting Western norms of Russian culture. Separation was a
more popular strategy than Russification.
Ambivalent about the private lives of the local population, the Russian Empire struck a
series of compromises between the ideals of the Empire and the local conditions it encountered
in the region. Life could go on in Turkestan as long as the region was pacific. At times, this
required the Empire to retreat on hard-line issues. An Orthodox-Christian state, the Russian
Empire permitted the practice of Islam in Turkestan. The territory was colonized, but not to the
same extent as the Empire‘s more valuable regions. Its colonization was far from a pulverizing of
local life in the service of Imperial expansion. It was an attempt to export material wealth with
minimal interference from the ―savages.‖ This strategy required pacification. More often than
not, pacification meant the deployment of Russian military force, not the development of
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compliant Turkestani citizens via the creation of a civic administration. The Russians did not
need to produce consent among the local population; instead, they forced it.
However, one person‘s trash is another‘s treasure: if Turkestan was not important enough
to require Russification in the nineteenth century, then it is immensely important for academics
in the twenty first. Revisiting Turkestan affords contemporary scholars of the Russian Empire the
opportunity not only to examine an understudied region of the former Empire, but to re-address
questions of conquest and expansion, of theory and practice, and of reform and resistance. By
nature of its unimportance, Turkestan has much to teach us. This paper takes as its starting point
the assumption that colonial expansion in Turkestan can no longer be ascribed to nation-state
narratives or Marxist dialectics. While nation-state theorists argue that state expansion occurs
simultaneously with national assimilation, the Marxists attribute state expansion to the
bourgeoisie‘s impetus to safeguard its economic interests. Neither narrative can sufficiently
explain the Russian colonization of Turkestan.
Nor can they explain the popular, unorganized, and non-class, non-nationalist resistance
to such colonization. The voices of reform-oriented Russian administrators can. By examining
the voices of Russian reformers, this paper hopes to reclaim such forms of resistance. Rethinking resistance under colonization provides new avenues through which to evaluate the
agency of the people of Turkestan. Most Turkestanis did not have access to visible forms of
institutional opposition, nor did they engage in open violence against the Russian administration.
Such modes of resistance are part of the region‘s history, but they were not the only ways in
which local actors sought to subvert the Russian colonial mission. Turkestanis did not have the
ability to organize national or class resistance to their Russian colonizers. Despite this, the local
population maintained agency by actively shaping their daily encounter with colonization.
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Russian reformers give us insight into the ways in which these local actors negotiated such forms
of non-visible agency.
However, reform voices appear to do the opposite: they seek to improve the Russian
administration of Turkestan, not overthrow it; they seek to reduce the agency of the local
population, not enhance it. Reformers were invested in perfecting the colonization of the region.
To them, they were liberating the individuals of Turkestan. Under the ideal administration, the
region‘s inhabitants would become liberal citizens, freed from their pre-modern, despotic
traditions. This is not liberation in a nationalist or Marxist tradition. Reformers believed in the
mission of the Empire, but they disagreed with its implementation. With this in mind, reformers
railed against the Russian administration of Turkestan not because they believed in the inviolable
cultural or economic autonomy of indigenous people, but because they believed that the
operation was just and that it could be improved.
Cast aside at the time of the revolution, these voices defy the dichotomization of politics
in the post-1917 world: they were neither against the Tsar nor for the Tsar. Some of the voices in
this paper have all but disappeared from critical discourse, but not because the Soviets violently
expunged them from the historical record. They had no reason to. Instead, these reformers fell
through the cracks, remaining in a gray area that contrasted with a world which became black
and white. Studying reformers affords us the opportunity not only to see the pre-Soviet years as
something other than a violent struggle between thesis and antithesis, but to rethink the colonial
encounter as well. These people wanted to make colonization work not simply because they
wanted to increase the wealth of one geopolitical entity over another. Rather, they genuinely
believed that they were improving the material lives of the pre-modern Turkestanis – a view
which falls into obscurity if we overemphasize their role in expanding global capital.
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By bracketing the reformers‘ role in improving the administration, we can find the ways
in which these voices describe the types of non-visible agencies necessary in rethinking the
colonial exchange between the Russians and the Turkestanis. If we avoid the moral charge
against reform voices, we can see the ways in which the local population was able to adapt to
their environment, forging new forms of resistance in a rapidly changing socio-economic order.
The attempted implementation of Russian civilization over and against that of local traditions did
not result in a loss of self, but, as I will show, often worked in the other direction, providing new
avenues for local agents to reassert themselves. Turkestanis did not just raid heedlessly, and they
were not essentially opposed to modernization. They were pliant, able to adjust to their social
environment in a way that enabled, not undercut, their ability to resist. Reformers shed insight
into the surreptitious ways in which the local population of Turkestan regained its agency in light
of political subjugation and economic exploitation.
They found problems with the administration. At the root of these problems were nonnationalist, non-class-oriented local actors. Ordinary people were the problem: the professional
witnesses who beleaguered the local courts, the merchants who excluded Russian traders, and the
Turkestanis who mocked Russian profligacy. These individuals did not operate with a
―revolutionary consciousness.‖ They conducted their quotidian affairs, and in so doing, retained
impunity from the Russian military. It was not necessary to leap into the extraordinary realm of
anti-Imperial combat. To do so would have been dangerous. Instead, resistance could occur in
the ordinary realm of pedestrian life. Such action was a strategy for maintaining physical safety
while simultaneously contesting Russian colonization of the region.
In addition to rethinking local agency, reform voices also re-cast the actions of the
Empire. Their work undoes an assumed uni-directionality in the colonial exchange. By
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attempting to modernize local practices, the Russian government did not just develop its hold in
the region. In some instances, attempted modernization undercut the power of the Empire. This
paper examines these instances from a legal, economic, and ethnographic perspective.
First, the modernization of the Turkestani legal system did not just beget subjugation
(Chapter 1). It introduced the use of witness oaths which allowed professional witnesses to
undermine the judicial system. Oaths did not create more trustworthy witnesses. Instead, they
legitimized the cause of witnesses who would lie for lucre. Despite stringent punishments, such
witnesses had no qualms with swearing and breaking oaths. A prevailing myth was established
among local judges: individuals who readily swore witness oaths were the least trustworthy.
Because of this, honest witnesses refused to sign oaths and refused to participate in legal
proceedings. To sign an oath signified one‘s desire to transgress, not abide by, the law. This
greatly hampered the administration of civil justice in Turkestan.
Second, Russian goods in Turkestani marketplaces did not drive out local manufacturers
(Chapter 2). Instead, Turkestani merchants competed with Russian goods by conducting business
in an environment illegible to their colonizers: urban bazaars. Russian goods did not permeate
Turkestani bazaars just because of the coercion of Emirs and Khans. Nor can we impute their
failure to propagate just to the Russians‘ belief that the bazaars were savage, pre-modern
institutions that were incapable of dispersing Western goods. Russian manufactures did not catch
hold in Turkestan because the Turkestani bazaars contested the Russian understanding of public
space: bazaars were not illegible to the Russians because the colonizers were too racist to
understand the local trading customs, but because the bazaars undermined the division of private
and public space. They were hybrid trading environments that challenged the introduction of
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Russian goods, and Turkestani merchants could contest Russian colonization simply by going to
work.
And the Russian production of ethnographic knowledge of Turkestanis was not just the
steam-engine of Imperial expansion (Chapter 3). This paper focuses on a specific idea of
―Asiatics‖ propagated by Russian ethnographers, administrators, and military personnel.
Asiatics, according to such individuals, could relate to authority only through fear and
intimidation. In order to cultivate power in Turkestan, they argued, the Russian administration
had to ―impress‖ the local population into subjugation. This logic reared its head in the Empire‘s
bloodiest battle, justifying the indiscriminate killing of thousands of Tekke raiders at Geok Tepe
in 1881. Tekke raiders, argued General Skobelev, would not understand a peace treaty; in order
to instill defeat into the Tekkes, the Russians had to impress them by slaughtering large numbers
of Tekke combatants.
Despite this, the reasoning of the ―impression‖ was not just the handmaiden of brutal
colonial expansion. It worked against the Russians as well. While the Empire had to impress the
Tekkes by killing them, Russian administrators had to impress the pacific urban population by
sporting high-quality clothing, for example. In order to create this impression, these
administrators needed additional funds. The impression was more than just a rasion d’etre for
slaughter; it was a justification for corruption as well. Local actors knew this: the impression was
taken quite seriously by the Empire, but it was a ruse in the eyes of some Turkestanis.
In conclusion, each chapter is an exercise in not only explaining the structural
colonization of Turkestan, but the ways in which that structural alteration was accepted,
mitigated, and reworked by the local population. Colonization in Turkestan was problematic not
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just because the Russian Empire simply did not care enough, but because the local population
had a role in actively rejecting the diminution of their autonomy under an Imperial system. This
role, as I hope to show, was flexible, existing in a series of permutations which ranged from
visible, institutional opposition – as is the case with the local courts (Chapter 1), to the
maintenance of a viable public culture that was illegible to Russian traders (Chapter 2), all the
way to simply knowing what the Russians did not (Chapter 3).
Chapter 1 focuses on the implementation of a Russian legal system in Turkestan, drawing
on the work of N. Likoshin. It seeks to highlight the bevy of problems which the Russians
encountered in modernizing the pre-conquest legal institutions of urban Turkestan. Chapter 2
marshals the works of Mikhail Veniukov, Mikhail Valikhanov, Yuri Kazi-Bek, and Nikolai
Maev. The chapter highlights the role of the Turkestani marketplace in forging what I refer to as
a ―surrogate public‖ – a public culture which was at odds with the implementation of a classic,
colonial economy of central production and peripheral consumption. And chapter 3 focuses on
General Mikhail Skobelev, Count Konstantin Pahlen, and anthropologist Vladimir Nalivkin. It
looks at one of the non-tangible ways in which the Russian Empire sought to solidify its
authority in the colony: ethnography. More specifically, the chapter focuses on the production of
a body of ethnographic knowledge which asked the Russians to ―make an impression‖ amongst
the locals – an ―immoral comedy‖ which the local population, at the expense of the Russians,
was able to see through.
Note to the Reader
All transliterations correspond with the guidelines issued by the Library of Congress.
Quotes from Russian sources were translated by the author.

Thrasher 1

Chapter 1
Historical Context
The Empire’s New Histories
In order to discuss the goals of the Russian imperial mission in Turkestan, it is necessary
to understand the goals and aims of contemporary scholarship on the Empire. In the early 1990s,
scholars in both the West and Russia benefited not only from an influx of declassified primary
sources, but from an influx of interdisciplinary frameworks borrowed from anthropology,
subaltern studies, and postcolonial theory. Such wide-ranging works were unified in their attempt
to re-conceptualize the two-hundred year history of the Russian Empire. Post-Soviet scholars had
access to sources that would facilitate such an endeavor:
The late perestroika years and the first years of post-Soviet experiments were exhilarating
for scholars who were beginning new projects. The archives, libraries, and other
repositories of the Soviet Union became accessible beyond the wildest dreams of even
the most dedicated researchers.1
Jane Burbank and David Ransel‘s description of the post-Soviet archives borders on an ecstasy
of information. Scholars with new projects expected new sources. Yet, the summer of ―wild
dreams‖ soon turned into a winter of archival discontent.
Willard Sunderland describes the dissipation of enthusiasm in the years following the
collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Soviet Union, regional archives in Odessa, Simferopol‘,
Orenburg, and Ufa had been off limits. The documents contained within them were surrounded
with an ―aura of special significance.‖ Fifteen years after the opening of these archives,
1

Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel, Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1998) xii.
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Sunderland found this aura in disrepair. The documents he encountered in the Empire‘s
peripheries were not ―appreciably different from [those contained in] archives in the center.‖2
For instance, material that Sunderland uncovered in Orenburg was familiar. Photocopies of such
documents had been available in open archives in St. Petersburg or Moscow during the Soviet
era.
Contrary to Burbank, Sunderland casts doubt on the usefulness of regional archives. They
proved unable to provide scholars with ―obvious documentary evidence that would lead to
wholesale reinterpretations [of prerevolutionary Russia].‖3 David Schimmelpennick Van der Oye
concurs. While ―many hoped that radically freer access to the sources would revolutionize
Russian history by opening an armory of ‗smoking guns,‘‖ such scholars were met with a
―reality [...] more mundane.‖4 ―The first decade of relative scholarly liberty in Russia,‖ writes
Schimmelpennick, ―has not magically resolved the major controversies of the past.‖5
In lieu of a deus ex machina that would revolutionize Western views of the Empire,
scholars developed strategies that would illuminate these regional documents. There were, as
Sunderland writes, discrepancies between the regional documents and their metropolitan
photocopies:
They [borderland Governors writing to St. Petersburg] created generalizations and
discarded vignettes, aimed for clarity and smoothed over contradiction. […] Many files
were initiated and matters investigated at the local level that simply seemed too minor to
report to St. Petersburg. Consequently, in a variety of ways the documents one finds in
the regional archives – local crime reports, local statistical surveys, local petitions, letters

2

William Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2004) 231.
3
Sunderland 231.
4
David Schimmelpennick van der Oye, Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the
Path to War with Japan (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001) x.
5
Van der Oye x.
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from the governor edited or never sent – offer greater detail on the day-to-day life of
settler and native communities […].6
The regional archives contained a surfeit of information that was not important enough to appear
in the metropolitan archives. While they did not find a smoking gun, scholars did find mundane
information on daily life. New information dovetailed with the academic pursuits of the postSoviet scholars who delved into these archives: how did metropolitan plans differ from their
regional implementation? What was the daily experience of colonial life in the Russian Empire?
And how did colonized populations reject the Russian colonial mission? These questions were
not new, but their framing was. Regional archives gave access to the regional perspectives of
Russian officials who lived in the Empire‘s borderlands. Their writings, reports, and opinions
now counted for their own sake, not just because they were an extension of metropolitan
authority.
New primary documents cannot alone account for the shifts in post-Soviet
historiographies on Imperial Russia. Aside from new sources, this scholarship engages with old
debates. Part of this project seeks to de-nationalize the discussion of identity in the Russian
Empire by emphasizing the role of profession, region, and religious faith in determining group
affinities; to understand the Empire‘s stability as a balancing act between ethnicities, not as the
result of the Russification of these ethnicities (Crews 2006); and to closely scrutinize categories
of colonizer and colonized in an effort to reveal the multi-directionality of power – flowing not
only from colonizer to colonized and Russian to Other, but vice versa as well (Martin 2001;
Schimmelpennick van der Oye 2001; Cooper and Stoler 2007).
First, if the nation-state was the conceptual unit of past historiographies, then multiethnicity is the buzzword of new historiographies. In order to challenge the nation-state
6

Sunderland 232-3.
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paradigm, contemporary scholarship has taken two paths: (a) point to the Empire‘s inability to
modernize into a nation-state or (b) question the applicability of the term nation to the Russian
case. The former involves underscoring the Empire‘s unique modernization and draws on the
work of modernist theorists of nationalism such as Ernest Gellner (Kappeler 2001; Weeks 1996).
The latter takes a post-modern approach, denying the universal applicability of the term nation in
favor of the local ways in which the people of the Empire developed a sense of ethnic
community (Clowes 1991). Both approaches to the Empire are prevalent throughout the
literature on Turkestan. This paper will examine the works of Andreas Kappeler and Theodore
Weeks as indicative of the former, and those of Edith Clowes, Jane Burbank, Greogry Freeze,
and Valerie Kivelson as indicative of the latter. Turning to Turkestan, I will discuss the works of
Virginia Martin and Jeff Sahadeo as indicative of post-modern approach to the Empire. This
project is in dialogue with such works.
Andreas Kappeler‘s multi-ethnic history of the Russian Empire takes the former
approach. Kappeler de-nationalizes the Russian Empire by pointing to its unusual modernization.
In place of nationalism, Kappeler posits multi-ethnicity. This move allows him to rethink
Russification. The Empire did not force Russian culture on its non-Russian population in order to
homogenize the state; instead it was a strategy deployed for the stabilization of a multi-ethnic
Empire. For instance, the use of Russian was necessary only in the public sphere: it was not a
problem that Nicholas II spoke German in his home. The Empire did not need to intervene in the
private lives of its population. The goal was not to create individuals who were externally and
internally Russian; the Tsar needed only to ensure the loyalty of his non-Russian subjects.
In lieu of national identities and Russification, the Tsar promoted civic identities and
multi-ethnic policies. Grazhdanstvennost’ would bridge the gap between different ethnic
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communities, eradicating tribal ties and ushering the Empire‘s non-Russians into the imperial
order. Bearers of grazhdanstvennost’ would be loyal to the Tsar, not their ethnic leaders. At the
same time, they would still maintain their non-Russian identity. The possession of such was no
threat to the Empire. Bridging the gap between themselves and others, Russian policy makers, as
Dominic Lieven points out, established political connections between metropolitan and
peripheral elites, not by attempting to ―woo the peasantry or Russify the borderlands.‖7
While Kappeler and Lieven underscore Tsarist policy as a check on the development of a
Russian nation-state, Theodore Weeks points to the structure of the state. Kappeler posits the
Empire‘s policies of ethnic pluralism as a check, but Theodore Weeks focuses on the autocracy.
Like Kappeler, Weeks is a disciple of Ernest Gellner. To him, the Empire was incapable of
generating a group of elites who would re-organize the autocratic state into a liberal democracy
based on a nation. Weeks contests that the modernization of tsarist Russia did not ―beget
nationalism,‖ but rather, maintained the stability of a dynastic, non-nationalist Empire.
Following Gellner, the nineteenth-century Russian state apparatus, like its Western European
analogues, modernized. This required a standardization of the mode of communication between
the periphery and the center. Standardized communication laid the groundwork for the
assimilation of the two under a national bureaucracy. Unlike other European nation-states,
streamlining the mode of communication did not, in the case of the Russian Empire, come with
an expansion of participation in the government. The state remained an autocracy.
To Weeks, Russian nationalism was a force in the Russian Empire. This was a byproduct
of the Empire‘s modernization. However, he argues that nationalism did not beget a state that
7

Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2001) 229.
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would give power to the Russian nation. Instead, it maintained a Tsarist state that was suspicious
of the people‘s ability to rule. Russian Nationalism was not separate from the state, but the state
did not wish to organize itself solely around the Russian nation. Because History and God, and
not the ―inherent sense of nationhood among the people‖ legitimized the non-democratic tsarist
autocracy, the Tsar used nationalism and Russification as a state-protecting strategy just as
readily as used multi-ethnic toleration. Weeks claims that it is unfair to speak of a master plan of
Russification in the empire‘s borderlands. He exhorts historians to show how Russia was not
France, how it did not assimilate differences between ethnic Russians and others in the formation
of a state, but rather, sought by any means necessary to protect an autocratic multi-ethnic state.
When the Tsars deployed nationalist rhetoric, it was only as a reaction, not a platform for
Russification.
But the structure of the state was not the only obstacle in the formation of nationalism;
state policy cultivated non-national identities as well. Kappeler points to the legal categories used
by the Empire to classify non-Russian people. For example, the 1822 Statute for Inorodtsy (nonRussian ethnic groups) organizes the Empire‘s inorodtsy into hunters, nomads, and sedentary
peoples. To the Tsar, lifestyles were more a definitive characteristic of the inorodtsy than
nationality. To the classified people, other criteria such as language, location, and tribal
background were equally important to group identities. Like lifestyles, these categories were
permeable. The urban population in Turkestan was poly-lingual, came from multiple tribal
backgrounds, and moved throughout different regions. The Empire did not consider the people of
Turkestan to be a nation, but neither did the people of Turkestan. Any use of the term nation
would be an imposition. Identity was not crystallized in Turkestan. Both the Tsar and the local
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population understood group identity as flexible. Loyalty, however, was not. The local
population could be who they wanted only in so far as they were pacific.
Regardless of how the Tsar or the local population felt, some scholars have questioned
the applicability of the terms nation and state to the Russian case in general. This has included a
broader assault on ideas of formal organization, institutionalized politics, and individual
autonomy.8 Scholars such as Edith Clowes ask simple questions. For example, where is the
Russian middle class? Is it the obshchestvennost’? The burzhaziia? Or the intelligentsiia? If none
of these suffice, then where is the Russian public? Where is the group of private individuals who
extend their loyalties beyond estate and family in order to engage in a new social order? Where
is the legal protection of the right to choose and organize and the right to free expression? Where
is the presence of social networks and institutions that facilitate the individual‘s attempt to
navigate a new social identity? 9
Recent scholarship has attacked the viability of such categories. The Russian Empire did
not have this type of a public, but this did not mean that it lacked social organization. Gregory
Freeze critiques such ―normative interpretations‖ of ―modernization and development‖ for
―restrict[ing] our notions of society and social organization to the confines of formal
organizations.‖10 Freeze calls for a history of the Empire that is deinstitutionalized, more attuned
to types of informal organization. By bracketing the search for a Russian public that comports
with normative interpretations, such scholars have examined the public culture of the Empire.

Jane Burbank, ―Revisioning Imperial Russia.‖ Slavic Review. Vol. 52, No. 3 1993: 559.
Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. Kassow, and James L. West, eds. Between Tsar and People: Educated
Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1991) 1.
10
Burbank 560.
8
9
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Reporting on a conference of Slavists in the early 1990s, Jane Burbank summarizes Valerie
Kivelson‘s understanding of the term:
If we persist in using western categories, […] we may remain attentive to ‗fundamental
criticism launched against the existing order‘ as the only evidence of a ‗public,‘ and omit
entirely the capacity of Russian society to generate a politics based on consensus,
informal institutions and acceptance of existing structures.11
Without viable social institutions or a culture of ―fundamental criticism against the existing
order,‖ the Russian Empire appears to have operated with a limited public sphere. However, as
Freeze and Burbank argue, there is evidence for a public culture that did not manifest itself in the
comfortable forms of Western European nation-states.
While such work has rethought public life in the metropoles of St. Petersburg and
Moscow, it also affords scholars the opportunity to rethink public life in the Empire‘s
peripheries. Pre-modern societies such as those of Turkestan also lacked the social development
necessary to constitute a Western public, but this did not prevent them from forming a public
culture that operated in conjunction with an informal social organization. Without political
representation in the Empire, they also lacked the possibility for launching fundamental criticism
against the regime, but this did not occlude the possibility of resistance. By examining social
organization along different lines, we afford ourselves the opportunity to re-conceptualize the
daily life of Turkestan under a colonial regime.
But research on metropolitan political culture has not just informed the ways scholars
view the Empire‘s borderlands. Studies of colonization have impacted the ways in which local
scholars understand Russianness in the nineteenth century. For example, Michael Stanislavski

11

Burbank 559.
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does not ask why the Empire did not nationalize, but who would do the nationalizing in the first
place. To him, the category of Russian is unstable. Russians were not an essential ethnic group
that colonized Turkestan; in colonizing Turkestan, they defined themselves as such. This could
only occur during the colonization of the region; the Russians imagined themselves as an
ethnicity in opposition to their colonized Other. Stanislawski argues that this view obtains only
if historians eschew the ―lachrymose conception of history‖: ―the tendency of nationalist
historians to embrace the special pleading endemic to persecuted groups each scrambling […]
for the top rung on the ladder of Russian/Soviet oppression.‖12 Colonial history, in
Stanislawski‘s view, is not the story of Russian ―demographic and political‖ domination ―of
diverse national and ethnic groups,‖ but of the domination of ―Russianness itself‖ over all
players, whether colonizer or colonized, in the colonial arena.13
David Ransel furthers this by pointing to the permeability of the term Russian, a
pendulum of cultural identity which swings between an openness to external cultural influences
and a mythological ―native presence‖ which rejects all things foreign. David Schimmelpennick
van der Oye traces this out the with regard to the Russian colonial experience in the Far East.
The Russians, writes Schimmelpennick, viewed the people of the East in a variety of ways:
objects of conquest; a Mongol specter; or, in the work of the early twentieth-century Russian
Eurasianists, an indelible component of their own racial heritage. Dismissing the idea of a
Russian master narrative of colonialism, Schimmelpennick, in conjunction with Stanislawski,
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opens the door for an analysis of the ideas and motivations which not only drove policy decisions
in the Russian Far East, but defined what it meant to be Russian in the mid-nineteenth century.14
The Russians did not have the final say over what it meant to be Russian. Nor did they
have the final say over what it meant to be a Turkestani. Recent scholarship has taken into
account the ways in which colonized populations played an active role in this process. Edward
Lazzerini and Daniel Brower, in their anthology Russia’s Orient, draw on the work of Russian
semiotician Yurii Lotman in order to challenge the colonizer/colonized binary. To them, the two
categories mutually constitute each other. Lazzerini and Brower keep this mutual instability of
identity in mind by looking at the ways in which not only the colonizer, in this case the Russian
Empire, defined itself in opposition to its colonial possessions, but the ways in which the
colonized people defined their colonizers.
But how does this look in Russian Turkestan? Building on these general trends in
imperial historiographies, scholars of Russian colonialism have drawn on a wide range of fields
in order to give attention to the ways in which local populations exercised agency in the
Empire‘s peripheries. For instance, Virginia Martin draws on legal anthropology in her work on
nomadic law in the Russian steppe in order to understand the active role of the Middle Horde in
the late nineteenth century:
Through this investigation of adat [customary nomadic law] in practice, I seek to
understand the active role that Middle Horde Kazakhs played in negotiating the meanings
of imperial laws and nomadic customs within their own community, and in creating new
meanings to suit their diverse legal and political needs under changing socioeconomic
circumstances.15
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In studying adat, Martin does not impugn the Russian Empire for eradicating indigenous legal
practice, nor does she equate the loss of Kazakh legal custom with a loss of Kazakh selfhood.
Martin, like others in the field, rejects narratives of Russification and the ―lachrymose
conception of history‖ in order to find spaces in which local populations ameliorate the process
of empire building. In so doing, she depicts the Kazakhs as a fluid ethnic group, one able to
reconstitute their community under ―changing socioeconomic circumstances.‖ Martin does not
define Kazakhs essentially; instead, they are fluid, able to redefine, not lose themselves in the
colonial exchange.
Jeff Sahadeo‘s work on Turkestan also shows how the local population adapted to
colonization. To him, Turkestanis did not just bear the brunt of Russian racism. They actively
engaged with such discourse, and were able to re-apply it to their colonizer. For instance,
Turkestanis applied the myth of the lazy native to the region‘s Russian population. Such logic
did not abet the Empire‘s expansion. Rather, it enabled local resistance within the region. The
predominant stereotype characterized Tashkent‘s Russian population as drunk and indolent, the
Sart, Hindu, and Jewish merchants as diligent and scrupulous.16
We have now, after a brief detour, laid the groundwork for a post-Soviet history of
Turkestan. While this project does not draw on any sources from regional archives, it does seek
to address the metropole‘s sources with a regional perspective in mind. The following work
interrogates primary sources from Turkestan drawn mainly from archives in St. Petersburg and
Moscow. But it does so in order to find the everyday, to plumb the experience of individuals who
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lived in Turkestan and implemented the Tsar‘s policies. This project participates in
contemporary trends throughout the scholarship on the Russian Empire by rethinking the
imperial era as a multi-ethnic balancing act between non-nationalist minority populations. It does
so not by casting doubt on the Empire‘s ability to modernize as a nation state. Unlike Keppeler
and Weeks, this project corresponds with post-modern rejections of modernization narratives.
Turkestani society, like its Russian counterpart, did not possess visible social institutions which
organized a public critique of Tsarist policy. Instead, they had a public culture.
Russian Intellectual History of Turkestan
Russian Turkestan was a short-lived territorial unit. From its incorporation into the
Russian Empire as a governor-generalship in 1865 to its dismantling at the hands of the
Bolsheviks in 1917, the space between the Pamirs, Caspian Sea, Kazakh Steppe, and British
Afghanistan was explored, catalogued, conquered, and administered by the Russian military.
Yet, the people of Turkestan were not passive actors in a pre-ordained colonial drama of the
strong and the weak. The Kokanese, Burkharan, and Khivan principalities negotiated political
treaties; sought intervention from other colonial powers – the British in India; and resisted
imperial authority both with their own military forces – in the wars leading up to the peace
treaties of the 1870s and 1880s – and popular uprisings – the cholera riots of 1892 and the draft
riots of 1915.
The tension between the Empire and the leaders of Turkestan produced a series of
questions which plagued Russian administrators throughout Turkestan‘s lifespan – from the first
Russian military incursions in the Kazakh steppe all the way through the introduction of a civil
administration. The Russian imperial project in Turkestan was not a smooth, frictionless
machine driven by the economic self-interest of the bourgeoisie. Rather, the decisions that
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guided the conquest and subsequent administration of Turkestan were met with complaints,
concerns, and critiques from both military and civilian administrators who were involved in
implementing Petersburg‘s policies.
From the beginning of the conquest, Russian administrators found themselves mired in
questions of scope: what rationale lead the Russian Empire to expand its landholdings over two
thousand miles southeast of St. Petersburg? Why did they choose to incorporate some of the
most barren lands on the face of the planet into the Empire? And why did they stop expanding in
the first place, failing to incorporate Khiva and Bukhara and stopping short of India? Those who
were closest to the action were the least patient and the least rational. During the conquest of
Turkestan, the calculated expansion of the Tsar clashed with the vainglory of his military
commanders. Despite the Tsar‘s wishes, the accumulation of new territory in Turkestan would
not serve the economic and political intentions of the Empire, but rather the personal gloryseeking of his commanders.
Once the military quashed the final outposts of native resistance in the early 1880s,
questions of scope became questions of intention: should the Russian Empire curtail the power of
their military personnel and introduce a civil administration in the region? Such action, argued
some, would facilitate the transmission of civilization to the backwards Khanates and tribes. Or,
as military figures countered, the inhabitants of Turkestan were too dangerous to permit such
reform. In their view, prolonged military presence was not only pragmatic, it was absolutely
necessary. Any move towards a civilizing mission via a civil administration would bring the
seeds of pan-Islamic fanaticism to fruition and compromise the security of the region. However,
with the establishment of the Transcaspian railroad and the subsequent influx of Russian settlers
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in the 1890s, it became clear that military authority alone could not sufficiently administer the
region.
The end of the vintovka could not maintain order on its own: trade and civil law would
now play an important role in pacifying the region. The question was no longer as to whether the
Russian government should civilize Turkestan, but how this was to be done. Economic and
social concerns supplanted military fears of pan-Islamic fanaticism. How could the Russians
make Turkestan prosperous? And could this prosperity lead to peaceful relations with the local
population? In the 1860s, the Russian army collected tomes of ethnographic information about
the local population – they were concerned with who the local population was. In the 1890s, the
Russian civil administrators wanted not only to know who they were, but what they were
thinking: why does the local population resist Russian influence? How could the Russian Empire
make civilization, in the form of grazhdanstvennost’, take hold? Should Russian officials leave
local institutions intact, or rework the daily lives of Central Asia and promote participation in
modern civil institutions? An older debate was revisited: should the Russians interfere with local
customs in order to modernize Turkestan? or were those customs so entrenched that interference
would incur anti-Russian sentiment?
By the end of its existence in the early twentieth century, Russian Turkestan went from a
terra incognita on the Empire‘s periphery to a hotspot for the most pressing questions of the day.
Here, statists encountered humanists while imperialists encountered nationalists and Marxists. As
early as the 1860s, the questions which Russian officials asked abroad began to look like those
that they were asking at home in the metropole. In the oft-quoted passage from Dostoevsky‘s
diary, Turkestan was more than an arid stretch of land on the edge of the Empire: ―In Europe we
were hangers-on and slaves, whereas we shall go to Asia as masters. […] In Europe we were
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Asiatics, whereas in Asia, we, too, are Europeans. Our civilizing mission in Asia will bribe our
spirit and drive us thither.‖17 To Dostoevsky, Turkestan was a place where Russia could renew
its Slavic national character.
Russians were not just civilizing the Central Asians of Turkestan. More was at stake: the
Russians were creating themselves in the process. For example, early twentieth-century
intellectuals such as Nikolai Maev and Lev Kostenko saw Turkestan as a test tube for
civilization. Here, Russian intellectuals were faced with the challenge of building a modern
society from scratch. In their view, it was Turkestan, not Russia, where Alexander II‘s Great
Reforms could take hold. The colony would radiate grazhdanstvennost’ not only to Central
Asians, but back to Petersburg as well.18 For a colony of dubious economic utility, Turkestan, in
the early twentieth century, took center stage, attracting some of the day‘s loftiest ideas of social
engineering. By teaching the Turkestanis to be modern, the Russians could, at the same, teach
themselves to be Russian.
Conquest of the Steppe
Turkestan‘s relevance to the future of the Empire was not initially apparent. Before
Dostoevsky, Maev, or Kostenko opined on the regenerative power of the colony, Peter the Great
ordered the first military incursion into Turkestan in 1717. He was not searching for a tabula rasa
upon which to build a modern society, but a passage to India. Departing from Western Siberia
and Astrakhan, his two missions were unsuccessful. From Siberia, Imperial troops advanced the
Russian line 800 versts along the banks of the Irtysh River, extending the Russian military
presence into what is today northern Kazakhstan. From Astrakhan, the Imperial army suffered
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two defeats at the hands of the Khivan Khanate. Unable to extend the borders of the empire
toward Persia or India, Peter settled for a small piece of fortified land on the eastern bank of the
Caspian Sea.
The establishment of this fortification – modern day Turkmenbashi (Krasnovodsk) – set
the precedent for Russian military strategy in Central Asia for the next hundred years. Gradual
expansion marshaled by the calculated proliferation of locally situated military forts (upornye
punkty) replaced Peter‘s plans for a large-scale invasion conducted from Russian outposts in
Astrakhan and Western Siberia. This laid the groundwork for the political absorption of the
territory. In 1732 Anna Ioannovna accepted a pledge of loyalty (pokrovitel’stvo) from Kirgiz
(Kazakh) tribes in the Kazakh steppe and began the construction of a working border
(fakticheskaya granitsa) between the Urals and the land along the Irtysh River.19
By the mid 1750s, three powers were vying for control of the Kazakh steppe: Russia,
China, and Turkoman (Turkmen) tribes. In 1757, the Chinese government evicted all the Kirghiz
residents from China‘s northwestern territory, Dzungaria (Eastern Turkestan), and built a series
of forts along the Chinese-Russian border. At the same time, the Turkomans engaged in a series
of cross-border raids, devastating Kirghiz and Russian encampments and compromising Russian
sovereignty in the region. While tensions with China would last well into the nineteenth century,
relations between the Kirghiz and the Turkomans, according to the Russian government,
immediately improved. From 1732 to 1757, the Russians constructed a series of forts in the
Kazakh steppe in order to protect their border from Turkoman and Chinese incursions.
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In the government‘s opinion, these forts not only provided military protection, but served
as beacons of civilization as well. The changes in the local population were evident: located next
to these forts, the Kirghiz lost their ―ability to invade‖ (due to the proximity of the Russian
military). In the Russian imagination, this damaged the structure of their society well.20 Kirgiz
soiuzy were organized around the prospect of imminent danger and retaliatory raids. With the
arrival of the Russian military came security. The Kirgiz now had recourse to an external power,
one that would punish those who raided against the Kirgiz. In the Russian narrative of conquest,
the local tribes no longer felt threatened, nor did they need to raid against their Turkoman
neighbors. And by 1819, the Russians recorded remarkable changes amongst the Kirghiz of the
Great Horde in the northern steppe: the tribes had agreed to disarmament, abnegated brutal forms
of punishment such as the ―whip and the lasso,‖ and, in the spirit of the 1732 oath of
pokrovitel’stvo, pledged similar forms of allegiance to the Empire (poddanstva and prisiagi).
In response to these changes, Tsar Alexander I issued the Ustav o Sibirskikh Kirgizakh in
1822, the first official document concerning the structural organization of Russian authority in
Turkestan. Alexander‘s edict was a matrix for further policy in Turkestan. The ustav subjugated
the Kirghiz‘s external powers – the ability to regulate their borders – to the Governor General of
the Omsk oblast, while leaving their internal authority intact. Unable to regulate their borders,
the Kirghiz maintained jurisdiction over criminal affairs and religious freedom. The parameters
of Russian power over the Kirghiz were vague, but one thing was clear: the Russians would
continue to extend the Siberian Line of forts into the steppe.21 Faced with pressure from the
Kokanese and Chinese in the south, the smaller, less organized Kirghiz tribes began to ―willingly
submit‖ themselves to the Russians in ―rows‖ (1855, 1863, 1865), at times requesting the
20
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construction of more forts (1847). The Russian government obliged the requests of the Kirghiz;
it was a ―moral necessity‖ to protect their loyal subjects (poddannye).22
Pressing South
By the mid 1850s, the predominant concern amongst Russian military officials was the
unification of the two fort lines and the standardization of policy in the area. The forts that the
Russian military constructed in the Kazakh steppe were under the jurisdiction of two different
authorities (nachal’stva). In the west, Syr-Darya line was under the command of the Orenburg
Governor General. In the east, the Western Siberian line was under the command of the Western
Siberian Governor General. Communication between the two lines was poor, and both dealt with
the local Kirghiz tribes differently. The Orenburg authority, dealing with the Kirghiz of the
Middle Horde, maintained hierarchies of power, allowing local elites to retain their positions
while permitting them to live in Orenburg, apart from the Kirghiz community. Dealing with the
Kirghiz of the Great Horde, the Western Siberian authority abolished local hierarchies and
placed new natives at the head of the different Kirghiz communities.
Whereas the Western Siberian system produced ―shining results,‖ the Orenburg system
produced the ―most disappointing‖ – looting, robbing, and banditry were prevalent throughout
the area. The local ―sultans‖ could not show their face in the territory without a Russian
convoy.23 By presenting a single front under the command of a unified authority, the Russian
military hoped to prevent policy disasters like those along the Western Siberian line and increase
security within the region. Between the end of the Syr Darya line and the Western Siberia line
was a gap through which Turkoman, Bukharan, and Kokanese raiders could move with ease. The
22
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government in St. Petersburg was not enthusiastic about unification. In the eyes of St. Petersburg
elites, it would be a costly endeavor, requiring the construction of more forts and the deployment
of more troops. It also meant encroaching on the khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand. And
the Russian government was not eager to repeat the military failures of 1717 and 1839-40. Aside
from general apathy with regard to the region‘s economic prospects, Tsarist officials also pointed
to the Crimean War (1853-56). The conflict on the western border had sapped all available
military resources. There were scanty reinforcements available for deployment in Turkestan.
In the early 1860s, the situation changed. While the imperial government retained their
reservations with regard to military expansion in the region, a group of military generals took
matters into their own hands. To them, the time for unification was nigh; the Tsar‘s emphasis on
patience and gradual expansion held little credibility in the minds of military personnel in the
lands south of the Kazakh steppe. Thanks to the actions of these military leaders, the years 1864
–1881 saw a transformation of the region: the military unified the fort lines, established a
presence several miles south of the steppe, and temporarily silenced the Turkoman resistance
with the Geok Tepe massacre (1880-1881); and the Tsar created a Governor Generalship of
Turkestan, dissolved the khanate of Kokand, and reduced the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara to
Russian protectorates. From 1864–1866 alone, the Russian military added four thousand square
kilometers and over one million Muslims to the empire.24 Their acquisitions were formalized
later with the temporary statute of 1865.
The reasons for such rapid expansion cannot be reduced to the economic pressures of the
Russian bourgeoisie or the wounded egos of a group of military generals. However, this is not to
say that these factors did not play a part. By the 1850s, Russia had developed a bourgeoning
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textile industry centered around the production of yarn. After the outbreak of the American Civil
War in 1861, cotton prices skyrocketed. Russian industrialists petitioned the government to
increase the extraction of cotton from Turkestan‘s Fergana Valley, and, to a limited extent, the
government obliged. Cotton exports from the khanates peaked in the 1860s: they comprised 53%
of the total exports sent to Russia from Central Asia at this time.25 Yet, these numbers are not
sufficient cause to explain the growth of Russian political influence in the area. The government
only partially realized the designs on the Fergana Valley which the Russian industrialists
advocated. As Seymour Becker argues, such individuals were a minority voice in state politics.26
By the 1880s, Russia received only 5% of its total imports from Asia, and only 3% of its total
exports were sent back in return.27
During the conquest, the Russian government reacted to expansion with alarm. The
military was given strict orders, in several instances, to halt its march through the territory. Yet,
these orders were often times ignored. Pyotr Valuev, the Minister of Internal Affairs in the early
1860s, characterizes the state‘s sense of dismay upon General Cherniaev‘s conquest of Tashkent:
―General Cherniaev has taken Tashkent,‖ he writes, ―and nobody knows why…there is
something erotic [nechto eroticheskoe] in everything that happens on the distant frontiers of the
Empire.‖28 To some scholars, that ―something erotic‖ was the glory lost during the Crimean War
(1853-1856). What Cherniaev and others could not achieve in the Balkans, they could in Central
Asia: dazzling victory after dazzling victory marked the mid-nineteenth-century military

Seymour Becker, Russia‘s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1968) 21.
26
Becker 23.
27
Milan Hauner, What is Asia to Us?: Russia‘s Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today (Boston: Unwin
Hyman, 1990) 44.
28
Pyotr Valuev, Dnivnik P.A. Valueva, 2, p. 60f. (20 July 1865).
25

Thrasher 21
campaigns in Turkestan. And, as Alton Donnelly argues, the generals did have something to be
genuinely proud off. Cherniaev‘s campaign against Tashkent, he writes, was a masterful display
of strategy and skill on behalf of the General. Limited resources and the poor quality of Russian
military equipment prevented the Russian military from exercising a material supremacy over the
Bukharan troops.29
Back in St. Petersburg, Alexander II and his Minister of War, Gorchakov, walked a fine
line between lauding the might of the military and excoriating its pigheadedness: ―No matter
how brilliant the recent success of our arms, in a political respect they have achieved no
satisfaction whatever.‖30 Yet, attributing the Empire‘s expansion into Central Asia to a group of
unwieldy generals is not satisfactory for modern scholars. To some, this favorite explanation of
the central government was a strategy for dissembling the political implications of its actions.
Milan Hauner charges individuals such as Gorchakov with fabricating the ―myth of adventurous
frontiersmen‖ so as to justify the strategic acquisition of Turkestan.31 In light of this view, the
Russian conquest in Central Asia was more than an accident. Rather, it was an important piece in
the nineteenth-century ―Great Game‖ between the Russian and British Empires. The Tsar, as
British administrators in India feared, could have used his holdings in Central Asia as a vantage
point for a military invasion into India or as a piece of political leverage against the British
Empire.
From Military Action to Politics
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The first step toward the establishment of a Russian civil administration in Turkestan
came with the unification of military lines in 1865 and the creation of the Turkestan Oblast
within the Orenburg Governor Generalship in May of that year. General Cherniaev had
conquered the major urban centers of Chimkent (September 20, 1864) and Tashkent (August 5,
1865) months before. Yet, the future conquest of Central Asia was reserved for politicians, not
military personnel. Treaties between the Tsar and the respective Khans concluded military
missions against the three Khanates. These agreements delimited the extent of Russian power in
the region to a greater extent than Alexander I‘s Ustav o Sibirskikh Kirgizakh. With the treaties,
the Empire sought to check its southward expansion into Turkestan and the actions of its unruly
generals. In so doing, the Tsar changed the political climate in the region. Tsarist commands
would no longer go unheeded in Turkestan, and trigger-happy generals would no longer conquer
without impunity.
Dismissals of military generals evinced the seriousness with which the Empire viewed its
treaties. Generals such as Cherniaev had flouted Tsarist orders during the earlier years of
conquest, but such activity was not tolerated in a political climate that stressed negotiation over
conquest. The Tsar intended to enforce treaty conditions, and Generals who would not comply
with his orders were dismissed. Both Cherniaev and his successor met this fate. Cherniaev would
not play the Tsar‘s political games, and, on February 11, 1866, he overstepped his bounds by
refusing to remove his troops beyond an agreed-upon point outside of Tashkent. Per the Tsar‘s
orders, Kryzhanovsky immediately relived Cherniaev of his duties. Purporting a different
military strategy, the Tsar appointed D.I. Romanovskii as Cherniaev‘s replacement.
Romanovskii‘s military strategy was more amenable to tsarist interests in the region. Under his
leadership, Russian troops would occupy strategic points outside of Tashkent as opposed to
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remaining within the city. From these points, they would gradually weaken the power of the
Bukharan Emir and convince their neighbors, Kokand and Khiva, of their peaceful intentions.
Such a positioning of Russian forces would be less divisive than Cherniaev‘s plan of
permanently occupying Tashkent. Regardless, Romanovskii, under the orders of Kryzhanovsky,
annexed Tashkent in August 1866. Although he acted in accordance with the commands of the
Governor-General in Orenburg, Romanovskii was removed from his post for ignoring the Tsar‘s
order to leave Tashkent under Bukharan control.
By keeping the military in check, the Tsar was able to negotiate with the leaders of
Central Asia. He did not just brutally subjugate the people to Russian military control. Instead,
the leaders of the Khanates maintained control over their internal affairs, despite the military‘s
wishes. The treatment of Tashkent is paradigmatic of this dispute. Negotiating with Muzzafar aDar, the Emir of Bukhara (1860-1885), the Tsar ignored Cherniaev‘s plans for establishing
Tashkent as an independent city free both from the authority of the Emir and the Orenburg
Governor-General. In Cherniaev‘s scheme, the city would become a launching point for further
military invasions against Tashkent‘s neighbors, Kokand and Khiva. However, the Tsar rejected
the formation of an independent city that would fall solely under the military‘s jurisdiction. He
chose to not create a military state in Turkestan; instead, he returned control over the city to alDar. Such a move would save the Empire the cost of maintaining a permanent military force in
Tashkent.
The spirit of negotiation continued to trump military aggression in the region, especially
in the 1867 peace treaty between the Empire and Bukhara. Konstantin von Kaufman, the head of
the newly created Turkestan Governor-Generalship, drafted the new treaty on September 14,
1867 and presented it to the Emir shortly thereafter. Far from reducing Bukhara to a vassal of the
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Empire, the treaty resembled a trade compact between two equal powers. Seven of the twelve
articles of the treaty delineated the trading rights of Russians in Bukhara. This included the right
to establish caravansaries, maintain commercial residences, and reside and purchase property in
Bukhara.
While the Empire preferred the use of bilateral treaties to unilateral military coercion,
Kaufman and the Tsar maintained that the Bukharans would fulfill conditions that were not
stipulated in the written agreement. Such an expectation undermined the legal status of the treaty.
Attempting to force the Bukharans to enforce policies that they did not agree to, the Empire‘s use
of negotiation approaches legally codified military force. The Russians assumed that the
Bukharan Emir would absorb the cost of protecting Russian caravans in the region and that he
would not maintain external political relations with other states. In exchange, the Russian
military would not occupy Tashkent. Although the Emir never legally ceded such rights to the
Russian government, von Kaufman considered him to have done so. Al-Dar resisted signing the
treaty, engaging in intermittent warfare with the Governor-Generalship until he surrendered and
signed in 1868.
But the goals of the 1867 treaty never came to fruition. In hopes of amending the
shortcomings of the 1867 document, Kaufman drafted a new treaty on September 28, 1873. By
doing so, he hoped to foster Russian trade opportunities in Bukhara. In addition to the
commercial stipulations set forth in 1867, Russians would now be able to develop industry in
Bukhara and own real estate. The Bukharans would extradite all Russian criminals who sought
asylum in Bukhara as well as abolish the slave trade. Slavery as a practice, however, would
remain intact. In Kaufman‘s view, the treaty was the last step in abolishing all forms of legal
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discrimination against Russian traders in Bukhara. It was signed shortly after von Kaufman
drafted it.
Negotiations with Kokand and Khiva were less complex than those with Bukhara. Unlike
Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva had few possibilities for trade. Kokand‘s collapse in 1876 left a
power vacuum that alarmed von Kaufman, and Khiva was notorious for harboring Turkoman
raiders – a perennial threat to Russians in the region. Treaties with these two Khanates were not
economic pacts between two powers, but rather diplomatic tools used by the Russians to ensure
security in the region.
Lack of economic possibility left the Khivans with little bargaining power. The Russians
had reestablished a trading post in Krasnovodsk in 1869, but, unlike Bukhara or Kokand, Khiva
had meager prospects for trade and fewer possibilities for natural-resource extraction. Led by
Khan Muhammad Rahim II (1864-1910), Khiva threatened the Russian military presence in
Tashkent in the early 1870s. Rahim promulgated anti-Russian views during the Bukharan wars
and organized Khivan raiding parties against Russian troops in the area. Given the dearth of
economic potential in Khiva, the official solution to the threat of Khivan raiders was
subordination, not annexation.
This military strategy exacted a high toll on the Khivan Khanate. While the Bukharans
retained nominal sovereignty, the Khivans experienced a complete reduction of their
sovereignty. Despite the Tsar‘s wishes, Russian officials stripped Khiva of its right to external
political relations with the peace treaty of August 12, 1873. The Empire humiliated the Khivans:
contrary to custom, Rahim was forced to sign the treaty in person, both the royal throne and the
majority of the royal archives were shipped to St. Petersburg, and the Russian army levied a

Thrasher 26
massive 600,000 ruble fine against the Khivans – a fine which the local population could not
possibly have paid off.
The Kokanese Khanate did not harbor raiding groups like the Khivans, but its inability to
maintain internal order threatened Russian stability in the region. While Kaufman legally
subjugated the Khivan Khanate, he dissolved the Khanate of Kokand, turning it into the Fergana
Oblast in February 1876. Unlike Khiva, Kokand possessed prospects for future development.
Anchored by the fertile Fergana Valley – the largest source of cotton in Central Asia, Kokand
had the richest potential for natural-resource extraction in the region. It boasted a larger number
of urbanized oases and decreased levels of nomadic tribes and raiding parties. Combined with
the prospect of controlling Fergana, internal strife lead the Russian military to annex the
territory, sans treaty, in July 1875.
Kokand had long been divided between its northern and southern oases, with control of
the Khanate vacillating between Muhammad Khudyar, Muhammad Sultan Khan, and Nassar adDin in the years leading up to the annexation. It also maintained a tempestuous relationship with
Bukhara, specifically with regard to disputed territories in western Kokand. During the
negotiations which cost Cherniaev his job in 1865, the Emir of Bukhara had gone so far as to
occupy the southern half of Kokand, temporarily placing Bil Bachi, a Bukharan, in power. The
Russian military was suspicious of Kokand‘s ability to remain both internally cohesive and
peaceful.
From Treaties to Civil Administration
With the legal subjugation of the region completed by the mid 1870s, the ground was
prepared for a transformation in Russian policy. By the 1880s, Turkestan was no longer just a

Thrasher 27
military-controlled possession on the Empire‘s borderlands. The construction of the TransCaspian railroad and establishment of a regional political agency evinced a paradigm shift in
imperial policy. On November 12, 1885, N.V. Chariakov was appointed the head of the first
political agency in Bukhara. His inauguration signaled a new type of authority in Turkestan.
While the Governor General had already been present in the region for over twenty years, he had
enjoyed the powers of the Russian military. Chariakov‘s powers were not military, but civil. He
oversaw the construction of the trans-Caspian railroad, supervised the Russian civilian
settlements in Turkestan, issued visas, wrote reports, entertained international visitors, and
censored public material printed in the region. The message was clear: the Empire was no longer
concerned with defending themselves from the local population; instead, it was ready to integrate
them.
In addition to creating a government bureaucracy in Turkestan, the Tsar crafted a new
public image for Turkestan abroad. As Daniel Brower writes, the Empire engaged in an
advertising campaign that saw Turkestan take center stage at the 1900 Paris World‘s Fair. A
large part of Russia‘s booth was focused on their newest colonial possession. Cotton from the
Fergana valley, dazzling portraits, and representatives from Turkestan were all on hand. With the
introduction of a railroad and civil administration, the region could command the limelight in
Paris as the ―jewel in the crown of the Russian tsar.‖32
The Empire‘s impressive show in Paris had tangible effects back home. Instead of
disregarding or fearing Islamic practice, the Russian administration drafted policies that directly
affected religious practice. Islam had not disappeared as a cultural force in Turkestan. In 1908,
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the Tsar acknowledged this by appointing Said Ghani-bay to the post of general agent for
Muslim Turkestani pilgrims. The government could not end pilgrimages to Mecca, but they
could regulate and facilitate them. Ghani-bay chartered shifts and over saw public health as
scores of the region‘s Islamic population carried out the Hajj. Such an appointment was a shift
towards cooperation and integration – the Hajj was targeted as a practice that could be
modernized and regulated, not wiped out.
However, older debates did not disappear with the completion of the railroad. Neither did
the military. Anti-Islamic stalwarts reared their heads during the 1902 and 1911 debates over the
Turkestan Temporary Statute. In those years, the Tsar held conferences regarding the creation of
a permanent statute for Turkestan. They were the first in nearly fifty years. The questions were
the same: are the people of Turkestan prepared for full civil society? or is the maintenance of
military authority necessary in protecting Russian interests from a potential pan-Islamic threat?
Turkestanis enjoyed privileges that were unheard of in the Empire‘s other possessions: they were
not taxed and they were not conscripted. Military personnel sought to maintain their authority in
the region but at the same time lobbied for conscription; civil administrators wanted the end of
the Governor Generalship – an artifact they viewed as temporary – in favor of a solely civil
authority in the region. Such an arrangement would facilitate the taxation of the local population.
Despite such dialogues, the Temporary Statute remained in effect until the Bolshevik Revolution.
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Chapter 2
Likoshin and the Law in Turkestan
The Russians targeted certain local practices as obstacles to grazhdanstennost’. Prevalent
among these was the use of Islamic religious law, Shari‘a. While work has already been done on
the Russian makeover of nomadic law in the Kazakh Steppe, this chapter will examine the
struggle between the courts of the Russian Empire and the Islamic courts of the Protectorates. 33
South of the Kirghiz steppe, the Russians encountered an impasse. The Empire had both
abolished slavery and rescued the individual from the tyranny of the Emir‘s whimsy, but it did
not cancel the practice of Islamic law. In the Russian imagination, Shari‘a was akin to Islam
itself. It could not be actively extirpated; instead, by modernizing the political, legal, and
economic conditions of Turkestan, the Empire could ensure Shari‘a‘s gradual effacement.
Eradicating the courts would alienate the Islamic population from the Russian cause. Working
through them would win the loyalty of the local population while at the same time shepherding it
into modernity. Because of this, Turkestani Shar‘ia courts retained their legal authority over the
Muslim population. Unlike the French in Algeria or the British in India, the Russians did not
reduce Turkestani courts to the status of moral authorities.34 On the contrary, these courts
continued to pass legal judgment.
But the Russians also practiced law in Turkestan. In addition to maintaining jurisdiction
over Russian subjects in the region, the Turkestan Governor General sat at the head of the local
court of appeals. This bifurcation of legal authority produced sticky questions: was a Russian
citizen within the Protectorates subject to Islamic law? And what if the individual broke a law
33
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that did not exist in the Russian legal code? Under whose jurisdiction fell the countless nomadic
tribes which lived outside the borders of the protectorate, but who were not fully integrated into
the Empire? Could these tribes be relied on to practice a form of customary, non-Islamic law
(adat) which satisfied the juridical inclinations of the Tsar? And what about extradition? Could
the Russian Empire rely on the Khans to extradite Russian criminals who sought asylum within
the borders of the Protectorates? Outside of criminal court, civil questions abounded as well:
could an Islamic court strip a Russian citizen of property held within the borders of the
Protectorate? Who should handle lawsuits brought between Russians and Muslim Turkestanis?
Could an Islamic court sanction marriage between a Russian and a Muslim? And could the local
courts legally protect the right of inheritance? – a crucial component in establishing capitalism.
These questions were the topic of frequent debate amongst reformers throughout the late
nineteenth century. At the same time, they evinced a mistrust between the Russian administration
and the local purveyors of Islamic law. By calling into question jurisdiction borders, extradition
processes, and the civil capabilities of the Islamic courts, the Russians were asking higher-level
questions: could the local courts be trusted with laying the groundwork for civilization? Could
they protect the development of private property? Capital? The right of the individual over and
against the despotic Emir? The Russians were not sure. Yet, they made an attempt: the local
courts of the Khanates, existing before the Russian conquest of the region, were given sole
control over legal matters regarding Turkestanis within the Russian protectorates.
Such bifurcation of legal authority in the region created problems for nineteenth-century
legal reformers. This chapter focuses on the proposals of N.C. Likoshin, a Russian administrator
in Turkestan who worked with the local courts. In his 1916 work, Pol’ zhini v Turkestan,
Likoshin lambasts the Russian administration for its inability to fully modernize the local
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Turkestani courts. Having worked only in Tashkent, Likoshin‘s experience of Islamic law was
limited to the courts of the urbanized oases. However, he does not hesitate to generalize. His
account is sweeping, providing a scathing analysis of what he believed to be the shortcomings of
Islamic law in general.
His biases are akin to those of other European commentators on Islamic law. Likoshin,
like Max Weber, diametrically opposes Islamic law to its Western equivalent: Western legal
theory values impartiality and the use of either established precedent (common law) or a civil
code (civil law); Islamic law is non-standardized and arbitrary. While Russian law would spread
grazhdanstvennost’ throughout Turkestan, Shari‘a propagated its antithesis: darkness and
deception.35 Knut Vikor points to a favorite image among commentators such as Likoshin and
Weber: the solitary kadi, an Islamic judge, who sits under a tree, dispensing justice at his fancy
with regard only for expediency and convenience, not for rationality.36 But there is more to
Likoshin‘s analysis than blatant racism. His report reveals a mechanism of local resistance. On
the one hand impugning Turkestani courts as an obstacle in the development of
grazhdanstvennost’, Likoshin also shows how the courts were a weapon in the hands of a group
of local actors who subverted the Russian colonial project.
To begin with, Likoshin did not find the courts to be worthless vestiges of an antediluvian
society. The Russian administration of Turkestan could, and should, in his opinion, revamp the
traditional function of the courts. While the Russians did not seek to convert the local population
to Orthodox Christianity – a policy which failed in the Caucasus – it did attempt to convert them
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to an idea of secular law, a concept which does not exist in Islamic society. This process was
never completed, leaving in its place a series of local traditional courts under the authority of a
modern legal administration. While the bifurcation of authority befuddled Russian
commentators, the half-modernization of local courts left Turkestani judges in a precarious
position. Some courts continued to rule on non-secular cases, whereas others did not; some acted
as civil courts, whereas others continued to act as religious institutions. On the one hand, local,
and on the other, responsible to the Governor General, the local courts maintained traditional
practices while at the same time reconciling such practices with the Empire‘s standards for
justice. This is the role the Empire had cut out for them: the local courts were to remain religious
while becoming civic at the same time; they would be both Islamic and Russian.
As I will show, the Russian Governor Generalship applied several changes to the courts
that challenged their ability to operate as Islamic institutions. It introduced the use of public
elections in judge selection, decreased the funding to Islamic education, required witness oaths,
altered the requirements for the position of judge, sought a systemization of Shar‘ia
interpretation, worked towards judicial impartiality, and established an appeals process. These
modifications were meant to transform courts from the handmaidens of despotism into the
watchdogs of a modern civilization. Pretending to preserve the traditional function of the courts,
the above-described transformations radically restructured local legal practice. The Governor
Generalship required the local courts to adapt structural alterations that challenged their ability to
function as Islamic courts. For instance, both the systemization of Shar‘ia and the use of witness
oaths are contrary to Shar‘ia practice – such changes required Turkestani judges to practice an
unfamiliar form of legal interpretation.
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However, such modifications did not dismantle the practice of traditional law in
Turkestan; instead, it opened up venues through which local actors could thwart Empire-building
in the region. Reform did not always move the courts in a more modern direction. In other
words, Russian modernization did not beget Turkestani acquiescence. Some reforms, especially
the introduction of witness oaths, moved the courts farther away from the status of a modern
legal institution. The courts did not resist the civilizing mission because they were intractable,
unable to be brought into modernity; on the contrary, their gradual modernization provided
avenues through which the courts could become resistant. By attempting to erase the practice of
Islamic law, the Russians did not just attempt to Russify the population and cement their
authority in the region. Instead, they provided ways for local actors to re-orientate anti-colonial
resistance in a rapidly changing socio-political order. This can be seen if we move beyond
nation-state paradigms of imperial historiography.
Pre-Conquest Courts
On one hand, Likoshin‘s analysis appears only to reinforce the above-described binary
between Western and Islamic courts. His portrait of pre-conquest Islamic courts is
uncompromising in this regard. In his description, the positions of the kadi and the rais,
enforcers of religious practice, dominated local legal institutions before the arrival of the
Russians. The former oversaw the criminal and civil affairs of the local population while
retaining the power of life and death over the people of the Khanate. Handpicked by the Emir,
the kadi was expected to comply with his wishes, to rule in favor of his allies and to rule against
his enemies. Because of this, the qualifications for becoming a kadi were lax. Aside from
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graduating from a madrasa, eligible individuals needed only to have no criminal background and
be "open, healthy, of a mature age, and Muslim."37
Likoshin‘s understanding of the pre-conquest kadi does not perfectly coincide with
Weber‘s kadi under the tree. He understood that the kadi could not simply form their opinions
out of thin air. Instead, they would have to root their opinion via a well-founded riwayat, an
interpretation of Shari'a.38 An explicit appeal to any other external authority – for instance, an
order of the Emir – would strip the opinion of its validity and oftentimes endanger the kadi.39
What emerged from this was a class of legal professionals dedicated to toeing the line between
pleasing the Emir and pleasing the religious authorities, between ruling in terms of political
correctness – i.e. appeasing their political leader – and in terms of religious correctness – i.e.
drawing all of their opinions from Shar‘ia. Likoshin‘s final conclusion was not far from Weber‘s.
He still understood the kadi as a subjective purveyor of justice. They were just cleverer than
Weber imagined, able to root their whimsical decisions in obscure readings of Shar‘ia. While the
kadi presented clear challenges to legal reformers, they were, at the very least, something akin to
the Russian concept of a modern judge. By focusing solely on criminal and civil cases, the kadi
were an incipient form of a legal authority that ruled only on the public affairs of those within
their jurisdiction.
The function of the rais, on the other hand, was unfamiliar to the Russian administration.
Like the kadi, the rais retained punitive power over their jurisdiction; but unlike the kadi, the rais
served as the adjudicator of an individual's private life – a sphere beyond the jurisdiction of the
kadi. They were not judges; instead they were religious authorities. Their jurisdiction was the
37
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community of believers, and their punitive power was reserved for transgressors of the moral
code as described in the Qur‘an and the hadith. The rais punished individuals for falling out of
accordance with Islamic custom – for skipping prayer or for unbecoming public behavior, for
example. There was no room for the rais in the new Russian order. Once again, the Russian
administration did not proselytize the people of Turkestan; instead, they attempted to establish a
state apparatus that would not aggressively expunge the practice of Islam, but rather, one which
would quietly dismantle it by divorcing Islam from state support. The enforcement of Islamic
custom was still permitted, but religious leaders would no longer have recourse to legal
institutions; nor would the state buttress their rulings by punishing religious miscreants. All such
authority would remain within the religious community, and no punitive damages were to be
assessed for violation of such custom.
Russian Modernization Efforts
The strategy was simple: the Russians would reform the kadi and dismantle the rais.
What emerged from this was a network of narodnye sudy – courts that adjudicated the civil and
criminal affairs of urban Turkestanis. Court rulings were still based on Shar‘ia, but the passages
concerning religious deviancy would no longer obtain. Additionally, rulings based on Shar‘ia
would have to conform to standards in the Empire‘s criminal code. While the courts were
allowed to maintain their traditional function, they would have to apply Shar‘ia as if they were
applying Imperial law. The matrix for these courts was the kadi, not the rais: the enforcement of
religious practice on behalf of a civil institution did not comport with either the Russian goals of
de-Islamization nor, on another level, the legal norms of the Empire. However, the neat division
of duties which Likoshin imagined between the rais and the kadi underwent modification as
well.
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This initial division existed only in the imagination of Russian administrators. As
supposed heirs of the kadi, the judges of the narodnye sudy were, in theory, meant to eschew the
religio-punitive function of the rais. But, as Likoshin demonstrates, this oftentimes did not occur:
I can speak of an instance, when in front of a narodnyi sud appeared a young female Sart,
accused by a witness of sitting, with an open face, in the company of a few young people
– none of whom were her relatives. They allowed rude behavior and did not obligate the
Muslim woman to cover her face before the men. The narodnyi sud, in the Kotsri region
where this occurred, sentenced the woman to a half-year of imprisonment, operating only
under the awareness of the necessity to strictly punish every deviation from custom,
saving social morality.40
To Likoshin, the Sart woman violated nothing in the Russian criminal code:
The law presented to the narodnyi sud correctly punishes locals for 'crimes and offenses,'
that is, for such activities, which [the courts] consider crimes by our European code; in
the given instance the female Sart underwent strict punishment for an act which, by our
laws, can in no way be considered a crime.41
It was, as Likoshin shows, difficult for all the kadi to make the transition from Islamic law – a
tradition which does not distinguishing between secular and civil law – to the European criminal
code.
However, it wasn't just that the Islamic courts had no conception of civil law. The switch
was not just conceptually difficult; it was logistically challenging as well. By asking the
narodnye sudy to rule otherwise, the Russians were asking them to eschew years of rigorous
training and preparation:
Under the title Shar‘ia is the clear scientific goal of Muslim rights, based on the religiomoral position of the Qur‘an and widely worked out by numerous law students,
dedicating all of their strength to the interpretation of the different harmonies of judicial
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positions with all the subtle, partial, situational casuistry. [...] An intelligent reading of
the legal books requires of the judge a wide knowledge of Arabic [...].42
Likoshin understood the difficulty involved in interpreting Shar‘ia law. To him, it was a set of
skills that required a high degree of social capital. To ask the judges to rethink years of training
was no small task. Furthermore, the Russians were asking the narodnye sudy to ignore the
patronage of the Muslim Khans:
Before, the Islamic science, established mainly on the study of Arabic, was located under
the aegis of the Muslim government which spent significant money on "talabilm"
(literally seekers of knowledge), that is, teachers and students. Under the influence of the
higher spiritual authority and the scientists, clearly occupying a position with the court,
the Muslim lords considered always the best means for the glorification of their name –
education of the "waqf."43
Educated under the fiscal tutelage of the Emir, the judges of the narodnye sudy were, in
Likoshin's description, equipped with a refined eye for the minutiae of Shar‘ia passages and a
sense of obligation to the Emir. This became a problem in the years of the Russian
administration. In order to create civil judges, the Russians could not simply ask them to rule as
though they were applying civil law. As we have seen, religious law was still very much a part of
how the narodnye sudy perceived the role of a legal authority. Instead, the Russian
administration had to circumvent the problem at its fountainhead, diminishing the link between
Shar‘ia and state financing. Fiscal support of Shar‘ia education would have to be cut.
And the Russians achieved this by redirecting the waqf, a crucial source of income for
Islamic legal education: "After the assimilation of Turkestan to Russia," writes Likoshin, "a
meaningful part of the waqf fell into the hands of private individuals who already did not take so
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close to heart the prosperity of the students and the patronage of [Islamic] educational affairs."44
The "stipends of the students of higher education (the madrasa) in Tashkent and other cities in
Turkestan," writes Likoshin, "were decreased to a negligible size of three to four people per
year."45 As we have seen above, it was not the supposed "necessity" of practicing civil law under
the new order which decreased the size of the madaris throughout Turkestan; rather, the rapidly
decreasing pecuniary allotments for such study seemed to play a larger role. "To live on such
means," writes Likoshin, "during the growing of the price of products of primary necessity,
became unthinkable [...], and so the number of those wishing to study the Muslim sciences
[Shar‘ia] systematically decreased with every year."46 The study of Islamic law was no longer
economically sustainable in the new colonial marketplace; like the practice of Islam itself,
Shar‘ia law would evaporate in the new world order.
But the practice of circumventing Shar‘ia education could only be aimed at future
generations. The problems of the present – the surfeit of practitioners of Shar‘ia law, themselves
products of the Emir‘s use of the waqf – remained unaddressed. In 1892, Governor General G.G.
Vrevskii addressed these concerns with his edict, Polozhenie ob upravlenii Turkestanskogo
Kraia. Aside from furthering the implementation of civil law, Vrevskii struck at the local idea of
a judge by re-establishing the narodnye sudy on the basis of popular elections. The people, not
the Emir, the Khan, or even the Russian Governor General, would choose their judges. After the
election, the Governor General would select the judge from amongst the top two candidates. This
was a striking innovation in the old court system. No longer subjected to the whimsies of the
Emir, the judges were now responsible, in theory, before the people. This arrangement struck a
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compromise between Russian military personnel and the growing number of advocates for a civil
government in Turkestan. Observers on the right demanded either the unmediated appointment
of a "trustworthy native‖ – a puppet judge for the Russian administration – or, going further, the
complete dismantlement of what was otherwise viewed as a senescent vestige of Turkestan‘s
pre-modern heritage. Observers on the left demanded the unmitigated authority of the local
population to elect their judges and the revoking of the Governor General's ability to choose a
judge from amongst the top two candidates.
While the introduction of local elections was certainly the most contested feature of
Vrevskii's decree, there were other, less debated caveats. First, the requirements necessary to
become a judge were standardized. Under Vrevskii's administration, it was not enough to leave
qualifications up to subjective inferences. (No one, for instance, would be judging whether a
candidate was "open, healthy, of a mature age, and Muslim"). Qualified candidates could not
have been arrested for more than seven days or fined more than thirty rubles; they could not have
been convicted of a crime; and, instead of being "of a mature age," the candidates were required
to be at least twenty five years old. Despite the promise of the new legal order, it appears as if the
criteria for judges did not change at all – age and criminal record, in other words, still factored
prominently in the process. Yet, while the differences between the old and new qualifications
were slim, Likoshin still believed them to be more than just a matter of mere semantics: the
introduction of new objective criteria, he writes, would greatly expand the potential applicant
pool. No longer could the Emir decide on a candidate who would simply fall in line; instead, a
standardized set of criteria would be the only touchstone against which potential judges could be
measured.
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In addition to establishing clear methods for the selection of judges, Vrevskii also
standardized the appeals process. The S”ezd Narodnykh Sudei, or appeals court, was composed
of judges who were elected by and from the ranks of the local narodnye sudy. At the head of the
S’’ezd Narodnykh Sudei was the Predstavitel’, the most powerful judge in Turkestan.47 Like the
election process, there remained an additional echelon of authority. The uezdnyi nachal’nik, head
of the Turkestan civil administration, oversaw the decisions of the S’’ezd Narodnykh Sudei,
reserving the right to overrule their decisions – a power no longer enjoyed by the local Khans.
Likoshin is unclear as to how this processed worked: would there have to be an appeal to the
uezdnyi nachal’nik or could he just intervene when he saw fit? Either way, the uezdnyi
nachal’nik rarely intervened in such affairs.
To Likoshin, the new hierarchy was more important than the dynamic between the S’’ezd
Narodnykh Sudei and the uezdnyi nachal’nik. Sandwiched between their constituents and the
Russian administration, the narodnye sudy were accountable to those above in addition to those
below. This reshaped the kadi‘s pre-conquest accountabilities. A new sense of accountability
coupled with the gradual eradication of fiscal support for the study of Shar‘ia, would, according
to Likoshin, transform the courts into emblems of the Empire‘s ability to modernize Turkestani
society. Furthermore, these courts would be more than just emblems of progress: by battering
Shar‘ia into correspondence with the European criminal code, they were to ensure progress.
But this new sense of accountability could only spread so far. Aside from the abovedescribed failure to eradicate the final vestiges of Shar‘ia law, the Russian Empire also failed to
introduce the cornerstones of modern legal practice into the operating procedures of the local
courts. If cases such as that of the young Sart woman were unavoidable, then the courts which
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made such rulings could, at the very least, be forced to make their rulings in such a way that
would placate the concerns of the Russian administration. It was not just a problem that the
courts continued to punish religious offenses. How they punished these offenses was also an
issue.
To begin with, the administration expected local judges to pass unbiased decisions.
Vrevskii had already created the conditions for such impartiality in 1891. Local courts were now
under the umbrella of the uezdnye nachal’nik, not the Emir. Because of this, Vrevskii believed
that the courts should have been able to rule without the Emir‘s interests in mind. However, as
Likoshin describes, loyalties to the Emir re-emerged as class loyalties:
The definition of the measures of punishment in the practice of the people‘s courts still
depends on the social position of the accused. Operating with interpretations of Shar‘ia,
the kadi, for the same offense, should sentence a high-ranking local to a punishment
implausible for his crime, and a middle-class local to public suggestion, and a lowly slave
to the most severe punishment.48
They also re-emerged as the personal loyalties of the specific judge: ―the judge of the narodnyi
sud negligibly raised his moral development over the masses, and by his birth and life is tightly
connected precisely with those locals whom he is obligated to judge.‖49 While the unpermitted
enforcement of Shar‘ia may have been of concern to an earlier generation of reformers, it was
the sub”ektivnye vzgliad that was problematic for the early twentieth-century reformers.50 The
courts, once subjected to the whimsies of the Emir, were now subject to the whimsies of the
individual judge.
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And the judges, writes Likoshin, had no difficulty rooting their capricious subjective
view in an objective interpretation of Shar‘ia. If the judges were allowed to use Shar‘ia law, then
they could, at the very least, interpret pre-modern law in a way that placated Russian legal
experts. Once again, if the courts were to be traditional in content, but modern in form, then the
very law that they practiced would have to follow suit. This required a systemization of Shar‘ia
interpretation. Due to the ―absence of any sort of systematic judicial interpretation of the Muslim
code,‖ judges use the ―books of Shar‘ia,‖ writes Likoshin, ―to accommodate any possible
interpretation. And the style of the law, he adds, facilitates such:
In Islamic legal literature appeared, with the passing of time, a countless plurality of
partial, extensive interpretations on each separate question of correctness, and authors, of
so called ―patva‖ (or ―fetva,” as they say in Turkey) were resigned to allowing for each
… so that in the given composition it would be possible to find an answer to any
question.51
Given the malleability of the text, the path to such interpretations seemed to lie solely in the
mind of the interpreter:
In order to write one book [of Shar‘ia] about multiple subjects at the same time, it was
necessary to go into such detail of judicial casuistry and to give to a great extent a
detailed selection of all possible cases, so that in the case entered inventions, not found in
the life of the affected people [plaintiff or defendant], and the path to such was lost, so
only the experienced hand of a jurist could find in the book that page which should be
taken as the basis of the decision on the given case.52
While Likoshin impugns the judges of the narodnye sudy for ruling in favor of either the wealthy
or their personal acquaintances, he excoriates the practice of Shar‘ia for allowing such judges to
base their rulings on whatever passage they so please. The demonized ―subjective view‖ of the
judges stems not only from the personal and class biases of the judges themselves, but from the
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very means by which they approach Shar‘ia. Thus, if the practice of Sharia could not be
removed, its interpretation could, at the very least, undergo standardization. There was, in fact,
precedent for such. Likoshin cites the work of Islamic judges working in Turkey.53 These
individuals, he attests, did not pick out isolated passages that fulfilled their fancies. Instead, they
understood Shar‘ia passages in relation to each other, plumbing out a more rounded
understanding of the text‘s meaning. This was, to Likoshin, a crucial step towards
standardization.
While the Russian Governor General believed to have already established the conditions
for objective adjudications of criminal and civil affairs, their fulfillment lied beyond the realm of
administrative reform – it was an ephemeral chuvstvo of the people:
The development of justice [spravedlivost’] must be observed in every condition in order
to define, by internal conviction, means of punishment that are uniform for every
instance, and can with confidence say, that not one of the narodnye sudy is in any
condition to conduct all of his decisions on criminal affairs by one or the other system of
punishment.54
Likoshin, however, did believe that the ―internal conviction‖ of spravedlivost’ amongst the
courts could be produced. This meant more than just exhorting the local judges to ignore their
class interests and cite Shar‘ia systematically. Placing the local courts under the Governor
General was not enough: the local population would need to re-conceptualize the role of judge,
lawyer, and witness. These positions, in the new Russian order, were to become independent of
one another: the state would finance lawyers and judges while witnesses would become
autonomous, objective observers.
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Having reduced the system of patronage between the state and Shar‘ia, the Russian
Empire would now need to rework the micro system of court patronage: the fiscal interdependency of the judges and the lawyers (and the lawyers and their clients) could no longer
remain intact. More specifically, the Russian Empire, in Likoshin‘s view, had to curtail the role
of the greedy posredniki, lawyers who mediated between the people and the courts. The
posredniki, writes Likoshin, profited wildly at the expense of their clients, especially when the
cases were settled out of court:
Such instances are straight profit for the vakila: after securing a written statement from
both sides of ―peaceful process‖ [i.e. pre-court settlement], the posredniki decide the case
so that it will profit them, and that the client will receive, in the majority of cases, only
the most insignificant part of the iskovaia summa [settlement], the remaining money
divided by the court peacemakers amongst themselves. The client leaves after the
settlement [primirenie], happy that he received anything from the mercenary and greedy
posredniki.55
Consequently, ―the general opinion,‖ he adds, ―was disapproving of such agents [posredniki] in
the narodnye sudy,‖ and ―requests from the population for their removal from the offices of the
narodnye sudy are often heard.‖56
Yet, these protests went unheeded, but not only for the sake of maintaining corruption.
Lawyers and their accompanying fees played an important role in differentiating amongst legal
claims: not just anyone could appear before a narodnyi sud, nor did every case deserve the
courts‘ valuable time. Hiring a posrednik indicated a client‘s commitment to their case. By
requiring such, the narodnye sudy were able to weed out petty and specious claims. However, on
the other hand, corrupt posredniki maintained their position for more pernicious reasons:
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The poverennye [approved agents] do not complain about their profits: they search for
clients and convince the locals to bring forth criminal and civil charges, promising their
indubitable victory. Because of this, the narodnye sudy, lacking allocated funds and
receiving money from those affected [the defendant or the plaintiff], is premised on a
connection with the agents, an established general interest: the poverennye give work to
the narodnyi sud and increase their profits, and the judges leniently look on the spurned
actions of the vakili – by the expression ―hands clean hands‖ [ruka moet ruku].57
In the narodnye sudy, lawyers, clerks, and judges all worked to keep each other employed. Over
against the people, the courts were, in Likoshin‘s description, a closed circuit which supplanted
universal, unbiased justice with the search for profit and personal benefit: lawyers picked clients
who would pay the judges and their legal advisors. Cases, in Likoshin‘s description, were not
brought before the court by virtue of their criminal or civil wrongdoing; in other words, justice
lay in the hands of an elite group of legal professionals who could, at their own will, choose
cases which would benefit the financial standing of the court.
Professional Witnesses
Not everyone who ―cleaned hands‖ was a legal professional. Affronting the Empire‘s
legal sensibilities, individuals managed to work in the narodnye sudy as professional witnesses.
Untrained in the interpretation of Shar‘ia, these individuals were outsiders, corrupting the legal
system not because they retained the residual influences of the Emir, but because they sought to
make a living. In doing so, they broke the closed circuits of the Emir‘s legal professionals,
working with plaintiffs and defendants in order to produce the evidence necessary for civil and
criminal prosecutions.
This had a disastrous effect on the courts by undermining the practice of witness oaths.
As I will discuss later, the introduction of witness oaths reworked Shar‘ia conceptions of the role
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of the witness. All individuals who testified in local courts had to swear an oath. In the hands of
the professional witnesses, the oath – a solemn obligation to tell the truth – transformed into a
business deal: he who swore an oath promised not to tell the truth, but to tell a truth, one desired
by their employer. According to Likoshin, these individuals, known as mutagami, struck fear in
the heart of local Turkestanis:
Accordingly, there is no shortage of swindlers [durnye liudi] amongst the locals, because
in each society they meet ―mutagami,‖ that is, people who lied under oath for any case.
The populace despises such people, and, at the same time, fears them. And this fear is
completely justified: you need to decide only once in your lifetime to cross the boundary
between a lie and the truth in order for the next opportunity to do so to prevent no moral
qualms.58
If an individual lied once under oath, then, it would be no great difficulty for them to do it again.
And, given the above-described relationship between judges and lawyer, an individual who upset
a mutagami would surely secure themselves an appearance before a narodnyi sud: the lawyer
would simply have to convince the mutagami that his case would win; the judges, always
seeking money for their courts, would be more than happy to oblige.
However, this arrangement not only benefited those local swindlers; it had adverse
effects on that group of honest locals who did not lie under oath. To be sure, the narodnye sudy
did not tolerate lying under oath. They were, after all, supposed to operate as a modern legal
institution. The courts levied punishments against those convicted of lying under oath, and they
assiduously distinguished between truth and lies:
The moral operation [of the courts] changed greatly for the worst. One verbal, certified,
known fact given by testimony became not enough. It required the application of pressure
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on the person who testified before the court. This was done in order to hear from him
only one clean truth.59
With morality decreasing – i.e. the mutagami increasing, the courts applied ―clear pressure‖ on
all their witnesses in an attempt to verify witnesses‘ claims.
In other words, simply swearing an oath of honesty would no longer suffice. Individuals
who testified before the court not only had to swear to tell the truth; they had to act like they
were telling the truth. These individuals did not only fear the wrath of a mutagami; they feared
the testifying before a narodnyi sud in general:
People who lied under oath, professionals and profaners of the use of oaths, made it so
that each local not only fears having relations with their compatriots who loosely
understand the taking of oaths [mutagami], but fears taking an oath before the court
himself, even for a just cause. Each disciplined person fears taking an oath in defense of
their action or criminal investigation so that they will not give rise to the suspicion that he
loosely understands the oath and that he, in exclusive circumstances, is capable of
bending his soul [lying].60
As Likoshin laments, individuals who are afraid of appearing too eager to swear an oath – a sure
sign of eagerness to lie under oath, will often lose their case: ―during the conducting of a case by
the narodnyi sud, such individual, fearing the oath, risks either being asked to swear an oath
himself or stand by as a shameless liar, having taken a false oath, wins the case.‖61 The result
was a catastrophic loss of faith in the ability of the narodnyi sud to rule justly in civil and
criminal affairs.
The incomplete modernization of the court furthered this dilemma. Pressured by the
Empire to actively ensure witness veracity, local courts manipulated the understanding of
witness oaths in classical Shar‘ia. In Shar‘ia, witnesses are not required to swear an oath before
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they testify in court – this process is later reserved for plaintiffs or defendants. In arguing their
case, a plaintiff or defendant may introduce three types of evidence: confession, testimony, and
oaths. All are oral – there is no physical evidence. If a defendant does not confess to the crime,
then the plaintiff introduces witnesses who testify. If testimonies clash, judges can either take
both into consideration, throw out witness evidence that they decide is untrue, or ignore both
testimonies. After dealing with competing evidence, the judge has, in effect, re-worked the case
in such a way that favors the testimony of the plaintiff or the defendant. In order to corroborate
the new situation, the judge issues an oath to the party who appears in the right. This oath is
binding. As Knut Vikor writes, ―an oath is under normal circumstances not ‗evidence‘ at all, but
rather the result of the judge‘s evaluation of the case on the basis of witnesses presented.‖62
But local courts in Turkestan did not maintain the traditional role of the witness. Local
courts did not allow witness testimony that was not truthful. Under Shar‘ia, such testimony
would have been thrown out as immoral – it was not akin to breaking an oath.63 The judge would
decide whichever party was in the right and only then introduce the oath. Oaths were not
evidence that would support judicial rulings; instead, they were the result of judicial rulings –
presented only after the judge had determined who was in the right.
Individuals who were accustomed to testifying under half-knowledge or incomplete
information were now not welcomed in the local courts. Their testimony was no longer just
discordant with what the judge considered the facts of the case; instead, it was illegal. While
lawyers and liars ran a closed circle, ―cleaning each other‘s hands,‖ the honest local, as Likoshin
describes, fell victim to the narodnye sudy. The courts were caught in between, on the one hand,
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plagued by partiality and corruption, but on the other, actively seeking to safeguard one crucial
principle of the modern court, the inviolability of a witness oath – a gesture that would
supposedly transform the court from its pre-modern days of Emir-based nepotism to an era of
accountability before the people. But because the courts prosecuted those who lied under oaths
and aggressively sought to verify a witnesses‘ testimony beyond asking them to swear an oath,
the honest local, afraid of donning the unscrupulous ease of the liar-under-oath, was unwilling to
testify before the court in general. Consequently, the courts suffered at the hands of those
―shameless liars‖ who were willing to risk material gain against the potential of criminal
punishment.
What emerges is a strange picture of the narodnyi sud‘s journey into modernity: while
protecting the integrity of the legal oath the court, in a counterintuitive fashion, remained, if not
strengthened its role as a pre-modern institution – i.e., the court continued to benefit a claque of
corrupt posredniki and mutagami as opposed to propagating the European criminal code and the
guarantee of private property. The Russians had spent a great deal of time and energy only to end
up where they had started: they had abolished state funding for Shar‘ia; taken measures to ensure
the use of the European criminal law in the new narodnye sudy; and established the judges, via
the implementation of popular elections, as servants of the people. Yet, the courts remained, to
use Likoshin‘s language, in the pockets of despotism, co-opted by the self-interested posredniki
and mutagami.
At first, the Russians appeared to curtail local legal practice in Turkestan. Shar‘ia
continued, but it would be a Shar‘ia that comported with the European Criminal Code, provided
standardized interpretations that existed beyond the opinion of the local judge, and issued
witness oaths that would verify testimony. The role of the judge was diminished: no longer could
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the judge arrive at their own interpretation of Shar‘ia; systematization required that the opinions
of others play a larger role. No longer could the judge discard witness testimony at odds with the
facts of the case; such individuals had to be punished. In addition to curtailing local practice, the
Russians cut the courts‘ fiscal ties with the Emir. But by doing such, the Russians did not just
produce the acquiescence of the Turkestanis, nor did they only produce open resistance to
Russian custom. Instead, they provided avenues through which Turkestanis could resist Empire
building in Turkestan. The mutagami were not intractable, unable to integrate into the modern
court system, nor did their integration require a surrendering. They were pliable, harnessing the
changes in local legal institutions in order to both subvert the Russian mission in Turkestan and
procure material gain for themselves. Their resistance was part of their daily lives – they were
just trying to make a living.
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Chapter 3
Of a Closer Texture: Trade and the Development of Civilization in Turkestan

As you must know, a piece of timber is a rude block at first, but becomes seemly
and serviceable as this arm-chair, under the skillful hands of the joiner. I and my people
are the block, the deputy is the joiner. Were it not for him and the Padishah [governorgeneral], we should always remain blocks – Sultan Ali to Mikhail Valikhanov.64
Despite the bloody lesson we taught them on December 28, the Tekkes
successfully snuck by the ravine along our fortified rivulet unnoticed. The Tekkes begin
raiding extremely quickly and quietly, and then immediately, as one, open fire. The
majority of them attack barefooted, with their sleeves rolled up and their khalaty on
backwards. All the while, despite the absence of a structure, there exists a known
organization.65
Like the use of Russian law, the development of a colonial economy was intended to
bring the promises of civilization to Turkestan. To Mikhail Veniukov, Mikhail Valikhanov, and
N. Likoshin, the process of civilizing the local population required the establishment of a
permanent Russian-Turkestani trade that would exchange finished Russian goods for Turkestani
raw materials (cotton and leather). In their opinion, such a trade would not only introduce the
fruits of Russian industrial production into the hearth of every Turkestani, it would modernized
both the local society and the Turkestani individual. According to Sultan Ali, the head of the
Dulat Kirghiz in Altai, Turkestanis would transform from blocks to furniture, from pre-modern
savages to imperial citizens.
Although trade was an important tool in civilizing and pacifying the region, it was not,
contrary to the work of some early Soviet historians, a reason for occupying Turkestan in the
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first place. Hesitant in its expansion, the Russian state was able to keep the expansionist desires
of the kupechestvo at bay. Tsarist interests of security and patience superseded any private
economic interests in the region. However, with the conclusion of the military conquest and the
signing of the peace treaties in the late 1870s, Turkestan became an incubator for a nascent
mercantile relationship between the center and the periphery – a relationship which was never
fully realized. Insufficient Russian capital, low-quality cotton, astronomical transportation costs,
and the actions of local Emirs and traders played a role in either rejecting the churning wheels of
capitalist expansion and its handmaiden, the Empire‘s civilizing mission.
Still, there were individuals who were able to make a fortune in Turkestan. These
merchants, according to military journalist A. Kvitka, did not rely on the tutelage of the Russian
Empire. Rather, they accumulated wealth on their own accord by learning the language, making
connections, and observing the customs of other Turkestani merchants. Contact with the local
population was difficult. Local Sarts, Jews, and Hindus dominated trade in the region, and very
few Russians were able to successfully penetrate the bazaars of Tashkent and Samarkand. This
impregnability was a point of contention for the Russian government, and several trade
agreements were drafted in order to ameliorate the situation. Some commentators attribute the
opacity of Turkestan markets to explicit coercion and the relative impunity enjoyed by the Khans
with regard to treaty abrogation. Yet, the goal of this chapter is to highlight the specific kinds of
cultural knowledge which were necessary in order to operate in a Turkestan bazaar – knowledge
which may have been off limits to Russian merchants. In other words, individuals did not only
need to know, as Maslov asserts, the right people; they also needed to know what these people
wanted and how they wanted it.
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The preferences of the local population and the culture of the bazaar mattered. The
signing of trade agreements could not account for this alone. Turkestan was not a savage place
that could be brought into civilization via the top-down introduction of Russian goods. Rather,
goods had to be created for these people and sold in their market places – a process which
required collaboration and compromise. In order for this to occur, the Russian administration had
to believe that such collaboration and compromise was possible, that the Turkestanis were not
savages, but potential consumers, that their market places were not hotbeds of despotic economic
practice, but local public spheres. This chapter shows how the work of anthropologist and city
planner Nikolai Maev and journalist Yuri Kazi Bek completed this work by re-examining
Turkestani individuals and market spaces. In Turkestan, they found a surrogate public, not
bazaars run by swindling Jews and Sarts; pseudo-private individuals, not religious fanatics; and
employees, not slaves. Such views capture a spirit of collaboration that the administration did not
have.
By taking into consideration the work of these authors, this chapter looks at the ways in
which the bazaars of Turkestan were modern on their own terms. Turkestanis did not have a fullfledged public sphere, but they did have the bazaars. By viewing these spaces as just pre-modern,
the Russians precluded their ability to trade in them; by looking just for the visible structures of a
public, the Russians were unable to find a localized public in Turkestan. Because of this, they did
not take the contours of the bazaar into consideration when creating their colonial economy. The
bazaars, in the Russian imagination, would trade Russian goods because they were superior and
modern. No further dialogue between the Empire and the local marketplaces was necessary.
Reading the failure of the Turkestani colonial economy in this light challenges an
alternative view on the situation: the poor economic development of Turkestan was the result of
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a failed synthesis between two discordant world views. Such a reading of the lack of Russian
goods in Turkestani markets points to the inability of Russian administrators and merchants to
abide by Islamic economic practice. For instance, Russians did not understand Islamic economic
tenets such as the prohibition on interest or the aversion to unequal wealth distribution.
However, this view anachronistically posits contemporary developments in Islamic
thought onto mid-nineteenth century Turkestan. As Timur Kuran argues, the above-described
examples of Islamic economic practice were products of the twentieth century, not a social
practice contained in Islamic texts and practiced throughout history: ―when Muslim Arabs,
Turks, Slavs, Iranians, Central Asians, or Indians of the early twentieth century expressed
economic demands, they usually did so without invoking exclusively Islamic concepts or using
identifiably Islamic terminology.‖66 When Turkestanis excluded Russians from the bazaars, it
was because they eschewed foreign interference, not because they believed that Christian
Russians had violated Islamic economic practices. Such a view maintains an essential divide
between Western and Islamic societies, between the Russians and the Turkestanis. The Russian
economic project failed in Turkestan not because the administration broke a primordial rule of
Islam, nor did it fail just because the Khans broke treaty conditions or the local merchants
swindled and cheated the Russians; instead, the project failed because the administration
underestimated the capacity of the Turkestani and bazaar to function as modern consumers and a
modern marketplace.
To begin with, trade was not a new idea in Turkestan, and the Russians were not the first
to exchange goods with the Khanates. Hindu, Chinese, Persian, and British merchants had
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frequented the markets before the establishment of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship. There
was also a strong presence of local Sart merchants in urbanized areas such as Samarkand and
Tashkent. One could even extend this logic back further into history, pointing to the rich
tradition of trade enjoyed by Central Asians during the millennia when the Silk Road flourished.
This golden age of the Central Asian Khanates is what Russian military officer Ch. Ch.
Valikhanov had in mind when he contrasted Russian trade with the trade of time immemorial. To
him, the dawning of Russian colonial power in the region signified the dawning of the historic
period for the Khanates. The Russians had brought order, providing entrepôts for the Khans to
trade their raw materials in Western Europe and Russia on a scale previously unimaginable.
In exchange, the Khanates received Russian goods that would drastically alter the quality
of life of every Turkestani. Leather, iron (cast and wrought), steel, copper sheets, needles, and
cloth – all manufactured in Russia – appeared on the markets of Turkestan in the mid to late
nineteenth century.67 While iron, steel, and copper were necessary for the construction of
Turkestan‘s infrastructure, consumer goods, such as furniture, for example, were to produce a
more profound transformation amongst the Turkestanis. As journalist Yuri Kazi Bek writes, the
Turkestanis were not just impressed with the ease and comfort of the Russian lifestyle, they
hoped to procure such luxuries for themselves:
With the arrival of the Russians appeared the wish of the local [Turkestani] officials to
live a European lifestyle. So they began to build more comfortable homes and furnish
them to a lavish extent – in short, they clearly appreciated the comfort with which the
Russians surrounded themselves.68
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As N. Likoshin elaborates, the old order of life could not satisfy such desires of the Turkestanis
for a European lifestyle. This would also change with the introduction of trade:
The life of the locals, after the integration of the region into Russia, changed drastically
in many respects. […] In the new order of the Muslim‘s life, he experienced a novel jolt
of reanimation and relative urgency. ‗Haste is the tail of the devil‘ – each Muslim, having
memorized this moral principle from childhood, has now come to forget this ancient law
of the oneiric East and to hurry – so as to earn more money. The locals quickly realized
that the new life required the expenditure of more energy than ever.69
Likoshin hoped that the new-found avarice of the average Turkestani would prompt these
individuals into fervidly consuming Russian goods while simultaneously effacing the lingering
vestiges of those ―ancient‖ Muslim ―laws‖ (‗Haste is the tail of the devil‘). The existence of
these Muslim adages not only fueled the flames of pan-Islamic fears amongst the Russian
military. Reformers, such as Likoshin, believed these sayings to undermine the possibility for
inoculating the population with a cupidity for consumption.
By introducing the aspiration for profit, the Russians did not just seek to negate these
timeless proverbs. Islam too would deliquesce with the introduction of the new order. The two
were supposedly antithetical:
[The locals] lost the long-standing, peaceful organization of daily life around the five
daily prayers. [The locals] began to complain about wastes of time – but sometimes
would arbitrarily skip the daily prayer in order to attend to more pressing matters, or even
outright forget to pray.70
As trade unfurled in Turkestan, the ―more pressing matters‖ of work would replace the idle time
spent in prayer. In the new order, people would be too busy to remember to attend prayers. The
mutual commerce between the Russians and the Turkestanis would not coerce the local
population into civilization, nor would it require the Russians to intervene in the conduct of local
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affairs. Rather, the Turkestanis would seek out Russian civilization themselves. In other words,
the Russians sought to weaken the hold of Islam in the region surreptitiously:
Current elders may be inclined to accuse the Russians, having arrived in this region, of
somehow weakening the piety of the locals; but it is impossible to assent to this opinion,
because the Russians in no way interfered in religious affairs. If the piety of the locals
was at all weakened, then it was no fault of the Russians, but rather of the aspiration for
profit.71
Keeping in line with von Kaufman‘s policy of ignorirovaniia, the advent of trade, as
characterized above by Kazi Bek and Likoshin, served as the mechanism par excellence for the
inauguration of grazhdanstvennost’ in Turkestan. With this in mind, Mikhail Veniukov, a
military geographer, wrote with confidence in 1877 that ―we, of course, should consider the
development of Central Asian trade as one of the best conduits of Russian influence and
civilization in Turan and its neighboring countries.‖72
Official sources corroborated Veniukov‘s hypothesis. According to an official circular
letter distributed in January 1884, trade boomed in Turkestan. The pacification of the region
occurred in lockstep. Written by an unnamed member of the Tsar‘s cabinet, the circular letter
was sent to all military administrators who were assigned to work in Turkestan. In an effort to
better inform the administrators of local history, the document includes a crash-course in the
military conquest of the region stemming from the invasions of Peter the Great in the early
eighteenth century through the mid 1880s. The text is dry reading designed for the edification of
future bureaucrats in Turkestan.
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Yet, the document‘s conquest tale mirrors the narrative sketched out by the above-quoted
individuals. According to the circular, the presence of military forts in the Kazakh steppe not
only provided security from further raids. The forts also traded with the nearby Kirghiz:
The forts formed trading centers for the exchange of raw products of the Kirghiz steppe
and some products [izdelie] of Central Asian industry [promyshlennosti] for the products
[produkty] of Russian production [promsyshlenosti]. The returns of a few of these points
– for example, Orenburg, Troitsek, Petropavlovsk, and Semipalatinsk – reached highly
respectable sizes and approached a few million rubles.73
While only a few forts turned a profit, the idea that a strong trading relationship produced a
salubrious effect resonates throughout the above-quoted passage. As described earlier, the
presence of the forts pacified the Kirghiz by abolishing the terms upon which their communities
had been built. If the forts achieved this by bringing security, then they did the same by bringing
trade. The former negated the threat of an enemy, the latter negated what the Russians perceived
to an Islamic malaise and laziness.
However, trade was a strategy of pacification deployed after the forts were built – not an
anterior motive for expansion which guided the Russian incursion into the region. Historians of
the Soviet era spoke to the contrary. P.G. Galuzo‘s 1930 work, Turkestan – Koloniia, while not
necessarily palatable to the political climate of the 1930s (Galuzo‘s work rarely cites Lenin or
Stalin), is an exemplary Marxist analysis of the colonial relationship between the Russian Empire
and Turkestan. Galuzo divides the history of the region into three phases: (1) deprivation of
indigenous independence, (2) economic subordination to Russia, and (3) national liberation
movements. The Russian Empire, Galuzo writes, saw Turkestan with ―meaningful interest, as a
colony, an object of exploitation.‖74 It was no accident that the Tsar happened upon Central Asia.
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The lack of communication between the center and the periphery, the glory-seeking of a few
bullheaded generals, and the power politics between Russia and England are not, in Galuzo‘s
formulation, legitimate explanations for the conquest. Rather, they attempt to conceal the Tsar‘s
meaningful interest in Turkestan.
While the above-quoted circular finds a few forts which demonstrated ―respectable
returns‖ in their commerce with the Kirghiz, Galuzo finds several. From 1827-1837, he
calculates the value of trade with Turkestan at 10.53 million rubles. By 1840-1850, that number
had reached 15.73 million.75 These figures are measly when compared with the value imported
from the Empire‘s more profitable possessions. However, the value of trade within the region
grew 36.4% in this period. ―Such growth of the economic connection to the borderland,‖ Galuzo
writes, produced a parallel growth in the ―demand to seize the border and establish the monopoly
of the Russian kupechestvo.‖76
The treaties signed with the Khanates in the 1880s codified this demand. In Galuzo‘s
argument, the treaties ensured that Russian merchants would no longer be excluded from the
bazaars as chuzhestrantsy. Instead, the Empire became the khoziain of the Khanates, enjoying
not only equal rights with the local Muslim population, but superior rights. These included the
right to live in the Khanates, to own land in cities such as Tashkent and Samarkand, and to take
legal complaints directly to the Russian ambassador.77 By the end of the nineteenth century, the
kupechestvo, Galuzo argues, had established a mercantile relationship between Russia and
Turkestan. The Russian imperial power quashed the local cottage industries, relegating
Turkestan to a site of extraction. Raw material (cotton from the Fergana Valley) was taken from
75

Galuzo 15.
Galuzo 16.
77
Galuzo 17.
76

Thrasher 60
the periphery where Russian industrialists produced finished goods which were then shipped
back to Turkestan. And Russian goods made from Turkestani raw material enjoyed a monopoly
unchallenged by either the remaining indigenous producers or the near-by British.
But not everyone saw the relationship between Turkestan and Russia as a paradigmatic
exchange between a colonial metropole and its periphery. Others, such as the above-quoted
Mikhail Veniukov, saw things differently. Venukiuv openly challenged Galuzo‘s narrative,
specifically with regard to the Russian fort at Krasnovodsk and the Khanate of Khiva:
Attempts at commercial relations between Krasnovodsk and Khiva (which they often
declare as a success of some economic importance) in reality are so modest, that the only
thing we can conclude about them is the current non-existence of such trade and the
unlikelihood of its expansion in the future.78
A believer in the ability of trade to conduct civilization, Veniukov agreed with the author of the
circular letter. Trade, in his opinion, would work to both develop and pacify Turkestan.
However, as Veniukov argues, trade was unable to flourish in the region. While the circular letter
points to forts in the Kirghiz steppe as success stories, Veniukov, turning to the Khanate of
Khiva, castigates the veiled ―they‖ – a likely reference to public officials – for declaring success
where there was none to be found. One cannot, he asserts, speak of ―a success of some economic
importance‖ with regard to Khiva and Krasnovodsk.
Veniukov is not satisfied with imputing the lack of trade to local conditions. Rather, he
proposes larger concerns with the trading enterprise throughout the region as a whole. The
Russians, he writes, could sign all the trade agreements with Bukhara (1868 and 1873) and
Khiva (1873) they wanted, but
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No agreement or enforcement system has to this day produced particularly significant
effects. Of course, one of the most important reasons for this is the insufficiency of
Russian capital; but furthermore, the competition with the Sarts plays no small role. Long
accustomed to the demands of Central Asians, the Sarts have old connections everywhere
as well as residences in the steppe where trading roads cross. But more so, the length of
these roads and necessity of camel-back transport sharply raises the price of goods and
often makes them un-purchasable for the poorer residents of Central Asia.79
The two reasons Veniukov outlines – the monopoly of the local Sarts and the negative effects of
the terrain on transportation prices – play out in other accounts of Russian trade in the region as
well.
While Veniukov viewed the Sarts as beguilers who consistently thwarted Russian
merchants, his contemporary, Mikhail Valikhanov viewed them as potential consumers.
Transportation, for Valikhanov, was also a serious issue, but it could be solved only by
producing a demand for European goods within the local population. Unlike Kazi Bek,
Valikhanov did not believe such a demand to exist. The Sarts, to Valikhanov, were not expert
traders with ―old ties‖ and advantageous knowledge. Rather, they were ―savages‖ who did not
appreciate the benefits of Russian copper, leather, or fabrics, for example. Instead of exporting
their cotton to Russia, the local population attempted to manufacture fabrics and textiles by
themselves in Turkestan. In order for the locals to procure necessary goods, they would trade
these products with their neighbors – the Chinese or the Persians. The Russians, then, needed to
convince the local population, specifically the Bukharans, to sell their raw materials to the
Russians as opposed to manufacturing them themselves. But first, they would need to teach the
Sarts to desire Russian goods.
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Without a demand for Russian goods, the value of exploiting Turkestan‘s natural
resources was dubious. Transporting this material to Russia was far more strenuous and costly
than simply manufacturing it in Turkestan. According to Valikhanov‘s calculations, a standard
export volume of 32,000 tons of cotton required over 100,000 camels to transport. All of these
camels required enough food and water (a rare commodity in the Turkestani deserts) to make the
two and a half month trek from Bukhara to Orenburg (the nearest stop on the trans-Siberian
railway). Furthermore, the path to Orenburg was impassable during certain seasons, limiting
camel trips to one per year.80 Carrying only hard currency back from Orenburg, the camels
would return to Turkestan with empty backs. Without a functioning railroad, the use of camels
was the only feasible option for transporting such large quantities of cotton, and the route to
Orenburg was the only route safe enough to use.
A lack of quality control in Bukhara exacerbated the transportation issue. Because there
was no textile plant in Turkestan, cotton would often arrive in Orenburg that was unfit for
production. It had not been subjected to the scrutiny of a Russian inspector. The transportation of
intractable cotton cost the Empire dearly. While Veniukov excoriates the use of camels and
petitions for the construction of a functioning railway, Valikhanov sets forth a series of proposals
which sought to either improve the use of the current caravan routes or, perhaps more radically,
to obviate the entire question of transportation in the first place. By building a full-scale textile
factory near Bukhara, Valikhanov argued, the Russians could instruct the local population in
proper cotton-growing techniques and easily reject unworkable material at little or no cost to the
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Tsar.81 This would allow the government to recuperate any potential losses incurred from the
transportation of low-quality cotton to Orenburg.
However, Valikhanov‘s other proposal did not require a vast expenditure on behalf of the
government. The camels, he argued, should not be sent from Orenburg to Bukhara with empty
backs, but with Russian goods instead.82 But before this could happen, the Russians would need
to ―create a demand for Russian goods‖ in Central Asia. Writing in 1860, Valikhanov‘s work
both predates and significantly challenges the work of Kazi Bek and Likoshin as well as
Galuzo‘s narrative of imperial expansion. While Kazi Bek and Likoshin saw Turkestanis who
were eager to extravagantly furnish their homes and supplant their ancient obligation to pray
with the newfound exigencies of a life spent in pursuit of profit, Valikhanov saw the Bukharans,
a group which Valikhanov considered the most civilized of all Turkestanis, as barbarous,
unwilling to accept Russian textiles.83 The Bukharans did not accept Russian goods because they
preferred their homespun products; rather, in Valikhanov‘s argument, they were not ready to
accept the superiority of the Russian product.
But this was not just the fault of the local population. The problem for Valikhanov was
that the Russians‘ claim to a superior quality of product was spurious. British goods were not
only ubiquitous in Turkestani markets; they were of a higher quality. Here, Valikhanov diverges
from the narrative sketched out by Galuzo. Whereas Galuzo believed that Russian goods enjoyed
a monopoly in Turkestan, Valikhanov demurs. The Russians had to send their goods to
Turkestan, he argued, because it was the only place in the world ―in which there still exists a
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demand for Russian manufactures.‖84 In markets where Russian goods competed against their
Western-European counterparts, the Western-European goods, writes Valikhanov, were
unequivocally preferred. Of a higher quality and more affordable, goods from Great Britain, for
example, dominated Russian goods in places such as Persia and China, forcing the Russians to
sell their natural resources, not their manufactured products, in these regions.85 Turkestan was a
place where a robust demand could exist; the Russians just needed to ensure its development.
In order to realize Valikhanov‘s proposal – that transportation costs be diminished by
sending camels back to Bukhara with Russian goods; the Russian government needed to
undertake the complex process of creating Turkestanis who would prefer their goods. If the
Turkestanis described by Kazi Bek or Likoshin were ever to come into existence, the
government would first have to convince them that the Russian product was one worthy of their
consumption. The Russians could not do this by creating consumers from the top down. Rather,
they had to rely on public tastes which already existed. They did not create Turkestanis; instead,
they had to, in Valikhanov‘s thought, create for Turkestanis. While this process could have been
traced out with regard to any number of commodities, Valikhanov refers specifically to fabric.
The fabrics which Russia exported to Bukhara, in his view, should have been ―of a closer
texture.‖86 The Bukharans preferred durable, not frangible, fabrics.87 If the Russians were to
compete with local manufacturers as well as with highly desirable British goods from India, the
preferences of the local population would have to be taken into consideration.
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What emerges from this is a picture of exploitation which appears more dialogic than
dialectic. Military journalist A. Kvitka, operating in Turkestan during the time of the Geok Teke
massacre (1881), captures the spirit of trade via his portrait of Gromov, a Russian millionaire
who made his fortune in Turkestan:
Gromov […] currently earns millions. Knowing the language, morals, and customs of all
the tribes of Central Asia, he deals in general trading transactions which, without
strength, would be unknown in this borderland. […] The main reason of his success in
every enterprise is the huge credibility he enjoys in Central Asia thanks to his strict
accordance to the customs of the local traders. […] Everyone knows him, fears him, and
believes his word more than the drafts and receipts of other merchants.88
Even the Russian military knew of Gromov‘s prestige in the region. General Mikhail Skobelev,
upon preparing for battle at Geok Teke, petitioned Gromov, not the Governor General for
additional camels.89 Gromov was an exceptional case. Few Russian or Turkestani merchants
knew each other‘s language. At the bazaar, he writes, ―one cannot simply observe speechlessly,
but must enter into conversation with people who do not understand a word of Russian, agree
over a price, exchange Russian money for Asiatic money, and agree upon the exchange rate.‖90
This process was difficult. However, Kvitka‘s portrait of Gromov is an important intervention.
Earlier, Veniukov bemoaned the subversive potential of the Sarts and their economically
advantageous ancient connections. Valikhanov, in a similar way, impugned the local population,
referring to them as savage for refusing to send their cotton to Orenburg. Kvitka, on the other
hand, venerated the merchant Gromov not simply because he accepted the customs of the local
traders, but because he became quite wealthy in doing so. Gromov is the merchant who
understood Valikhanov‘s principle of the fabric of the closer texture. While he did not explicitly
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engage in the selling of fabrics, he did build his wealth by elaborating on the pre-existent
conditions of local values and norms. He created a palimpsest; he did not simply impose a
dominant mode of life onto the people of Turkestan.
There is much at stake in Kvitka‘s image of Gromov. While the Russian government
protected the rights of Russian merchants in a series of trade agreements between themselves and
the Khanates, these rights, in the markets and bazaars of urban centers such as Tashkent and
Samarkand had little bearing. Some scholars attribute this solely to coercion: the Khans
intentionally restricted Russian landholdings, evicted Russian tenets, and used convoluted
Shar‘ia law to strip Russians of the opportunity to trade in Turkestan. There is another story here:
perhaps, as Likoshin suggests, the Russians and the Turkestanis were speaking a different
language. If, as Valikhanov suggests, the Russians viewed the locals as simply too savage to
appreciate Russian-manufactured products, then they were missing something. The locals had
preferences which could be met. Doing so would usher them into a colonial arrangement. More
so, the Russians did not only need to understand the local preference for goods, but the ways in
which the Turkestanis understood the place where these products were exchanged: the bazaars.
This public space was not just a site of savagery and swindling; instead, it was a surrogate for a
visible public sphere. It was a space which, like the tastes of the local population, had contours
which the Russians needed to understand in order to develop trade.
First, to Mikhail Valikhanov and Likoshin, pre-conquest Turkestan was not only the land
without a history (Valikhanov) or a conception of profit (Likoshin). It was also a land without a
sense of property. To Valikhanov, land in Turkestan was held by clans from time immemorial,
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passed from generation to generation by means of inheritance.91 The Khan could seize the land
of any individual at his own whim or fancy. Arbitrariness governed the division of power
between the pseudo-landholders and the despotic Khan. And there was no sense of cultivation or
entitlement. The land was guaranteed to the individual not by an investment of labor, but by
kinship networks and the caprices of the Khan. Turkestani society was distinct from what the
Russians imagined to be its European counterpart – a society based on rationality and the
flourishing of private property as guaranteed by a series of compacts between citizens and their
political leaders.
However, as Jeff Sahadeo argues, this was an ideal type which the Russians themselves
never reached. Turkestan, he writes, was a place where Russian intellectuals sought to construct
this European community in a peripheral territory which was free from both the strictures of the
tsarist autocracy and the ―violent history of European nation state building.‖92 Sahadeo charts out
the ways in which the Russian intellectuals realized these ends and forged a Habermasian public
sphere in Tashkent: the introduction of civic newspapers (Russkii Invalid), the opening of K.V.
Struve‘s private meteorological tower, the 1869 grand opening of the public hall, the 1876
establishment of the Turkestan Hunting Society, and the 1877 charter of the city Duma
(completely controlled by von Kaufman). In these spaces, men gathered as the active public of
Tashkent. Here, they engaged in political discussions, trade, and the fine arts.93 To Sahadeo, the
―associational life [of Tashkent] flourished in the 1880s and 1890s.‖94 Even the Emir of Bukhara,
he writes, participated in this dynamic outburst of civic life by ―donat[ing] funds to select
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societies.‖95 This ―dynamic intellectual society‖ would preach toleration and knowledge, not the
blind xenophobia of the military. However, this ―dynamic intellectual society‖ was mainly for
Russians. What then, for a public sphere amongst the Turkestanis?
Nikolai Maev, in his 1876 work Aziatskii Tashkent, charts out the Turkestani character of
the local public sphere. If, as A. Maslov asserts in the opening epigraph of this chapter, there was
no visible structure of Tekke raids, but a latent, ―known‖ organization, then Maev, writing five
years earlier, extends this logic further, applying it to a sense of proprietorship in Tashkent
society. Unlike contemporary commentator Jeff Sahadeo, Maev does not search for the visible
structures of an organized, predominately Russian society. Rather, he looks at the ways in which
the local population negotiated a public culture on their own terms. He initiates this conversation
by discussing the practice of land irrigation in pre-conquest Tashkent:
Of course, any conducting of water [for irrigation purposes], especially in arid Central
Asia, is combined with labor, and so, in Tashkent, during the time of the Kokanese
ownership, the earth belonged to him who irrigated it and made it fertile. Those lands
were called ikhyai-alvat [ихъяи-алватъ] and should have been divided from the village
lands by a popular vote.96 (Maev 270)
The irrigation of land was no small task in Turkestan, especially for the lands which lied outside
of the main oases. To Maev, work and labor played a central role in determining the ownership
of a particular tract; with the dissipation of labor came the dissipation of the individual's claim to
the land:

But as soon as the owner stopped working it [the land], it again was considered, like all
vacant lands, state land. State land is sometimes contested by an individual on the
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grounds of eternal hereditary ownership, but is returned again on those conditions, that
whoever contested the lands must work them.
Lands given to an individual from the state, Maev explains, were referred to as milkovii lands
and considered a gift on behalf of the emir.97 Such charitable acts were

Reinforced by the seal of the Emir, a copy of which was saved in the state treasury.
Furthermore, the received milk should have evidence of legal ownership via the seal of
the kadi-kelyana [the main court – N.M.]. Milkovii lands lie fully under the command of
the owner and can be sold, given in inheritance or as a gift, or even be returned to the
vakuf.98
Protected by documentation stored in the state treasury, the development of private property
seemed well on its way in pre-conquest Tashkent.

Land, as Maev describes it, was not held from time memorial by miserly clan-heads.
Anyone had the ability to petition the Emir for state lands. Neither class, ethnicity, nor political
allegiances factored into the Emir‘s decision. One only had to prove one‘s ability to work:

General city lands, during the Kokanese ownership, were divided yearly between all the
inhabitants who wished to become landholders. In order to do this, every spring, the
aksakali [village heads] would notify the locals to send their kashi (oxen [...], workers,
and extra hand tools) to an arranged place so as to participate in the cleaning of the main
canal and to connect their desired piece of land to the irrigation grooves. After doing this
for several hours, those who sent two or three kashi received two or three pieces of land,
respectively. Thus, everyone received land, as long as they were in the condition to work
it.99
While Milkovie lands were protected with the ―seal of the Emir‖ in the state treasure, they were
not private property.

For example, Maev does not outline a clear set of criteria by which to judge the
"cultivation" of a land. More likely than not, such a criteria was all together nonexistent. Without
97

Maev 271.
Maev 271.
99
Maev 271.
98

Thrasher 70
a legal system to ensure the permanent occupation of land (once it had been worked and certified
with the "seal of the Emir"), the Emir could easily take the land back into the holdings of the
state, referring to it as "undeveloped" and its proprietor as "unfit for the proper cultivation" of the
tract. While the kadi-kelyana, in Maev's view, helped further the claim of an individual to land,
its function, other commentators disagreed. N.C. Likoshin, an outspoken critic of the local
courts, laments the inability of the courts to protect the development of private property and
capital. The kadi, to Likoshin, did not print certificates which placed land "fully under the
command of the owner." Rather, they served to strip individuals of their property in full
accordance with the whims of the Khans and Emirs.

Building on Maev's above observations, the local population of Tashkent viewed its
relationship to land in a way that existed outside the idea of private property. Far from a despotic
community which held land from time immemorial, the locals of Tashkent, as Maev describes
them, already understood ownership as something akin to invested labor. A sense of labor was
already present in Tashkent. The Russians did not, as Likoshin imagines, introduce the aspiration
for wealth in Turkestan. Furthermore, there was already a space where these individual
Turkestanis could gather: the bazaar. Not a hunting society or a public hall by any means, the
bazaar was not a place where private, European individuals gathered as a public. As Maev
elaborates, it was a place where pseudo-private individuals – individuals equipped with the seeds
of private property (ownership as labor) – gathered in a pseudo-public (i.e. non-secular) place:

And here we are at a large bazaar, where any Asiatic may spend their entire life without
leaving. Here [an Asiatic] can dress, put on his shoes, clean himself in a bath, drink tea in
any tea house, snack on shurpi or polau, spend the night listening to a singer or in
contemplation of the dances of the bacha, etc. [...] Often you will see an open shop, the
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owner of which sits elsewhere near another Sart, leaving his shop unattended, not closed
up and not checking to make sure that no one walks into it.100
In Maev's portrait of the Tashkent bazaars, the people who trade and work there are not miserly
Sarts, Jews, or Hindus who swindle the unknowing market-goers. They are people who are
willing to leave their shop open to talk to a fellow merchant, ostensibly unconcerned with their
shops. More so, they are individuals who mediate their most private moments within a public
place. They never leave the bazaar. The market, in Maev's portrait, is not fully a workplace, nor
is it fully a home.
Furthermore, Yuri Kazi Bek complicates the image of the bazaar by recasting the bacha –
a child prostitute who worked to coax market goers into a merchant's shop – as a rational,
calculating employee, not as a slave or a symbol of oriental despotism. In his article "Bacha,
Sartskii Pliasun," Kazi Bek describes the influence of a bacha on a shop owner's income:

Everyone tried to court and please the bacha. [...] It is unthinkable for any Sart club (teakhan) to not have a bacha. The merchant-owner, not having a bacha, can safely close his
shop in full confidence that no one – not even the poorest slave – will come to his shop.
The presence of the bacha makes the Sarts courageous and generous: so, for example,
one kuvgan (cup of tea) costs three kopecks, but if a bacha is there, then the Sart will pay
10, 20, or 30 kopecks (a lot of money for a Sart) so as to gain his favor.101
Because all shop owners ―tried to court and please the bacha,‖ the bacha possessed a great deal
of influence in the bazaar, and competition for the best bachas was fierce. Kazi Bek describes the
story of a shop owner who wooed a fellow merchant‘s favorite bacha over to his side of the road
– ―you can hear many similar stories, only with different variants,‖ asserts Kazi Bek, ―in
Fergana‖:
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One owner of a tea-house had a beautiful bacha, thanks to which his shop was always
full of people; the owner stopped only to count money and thank fate for bringing him
such a treasure. Clearly, he cared for him like the apple of his eye and tried to fulfill his
every wish. But on the other side of the street appeared another shop, the owner of which
began to pander to the beautiful bacha, promising him more lucrative conditions. They
quickly agreed, and, not saying a word to his former owner, the bacha switched over to a
new one, bringing with him all the visitors who requested new trade. The old owner
howled like a wolf, started to beg the bacha to return, supplicated him on his knees,
crawled, and proposed even better conditions for him, but nothing helped: the bacha
stood on his own – he was simply tired of being in one place. Then, having been driven to
the most extreme despair, the old owner killed the bacha there in the tea house.102
Not tied to one owner by an ancient custom, the bacha, in Kazi Bek‘s formulation, is able to
choose his place of employment, to weigh salary options, and to grow weary of working in one
place. However, it cannot be denied that this was an unacceptable course of action. The bacha is
brutally beaten by his former owner at the end of Kazi Bek‘s story. Like Maev‘s understanding
of Tashkent property, the bacha is a non-visible employee. Not just a child a prostitute or an
eyesore in the Russian civilizing landscape, the bacha functioned as a seedling of the more
familiar types of a European society. He was a nascent form of the employee.

Finally, commentators like Maev and Kazi Bek show the ways in which the local
population was able to conduct their quotidian affairs while simultaneously rejecting the
establishment of a colonial economy. The goal of this chapter is not to unearth the ways in which
the Russian government could have perfected the development of trade. Individuals who
provided alternative views of Turkestan society, such as Maev and Kazi Bek, did not do so
simply to provide the government with the knowledge to rule. It is important that their views of
Turkestan were not popular. Instead, their documents open up avenues for analysis unavailable
to Veniukov and Valikhanov. They show the unknown, non-visible ways in which the local
population conducted their daily affairs – in this case, the trading of goods. A society lacking a
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visible structure, they persisted in maintaining an organization, negotiating ideas of public and
private lives on their own terms, as seen in the bazaar.

Yet, the military generals seemed to maintain the fears of a pan-Islamic uprising,
furthering the belief that the society‘s ancient laws prevented them both from obtaining profit
and from living peacefully under Russian rule. With this view in the foreground of Turkestan
policy in the late nineteenth century, why would the Russians believe the preferences of the local
population to be legitimate? Why would they need an understanding of the culture of the
marketplace? These spaces served as the seeds of a society that was anything but fanatic and
violent; a society that was invisible to the Russian military.
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Chapter 4
Making an Impression
As shown in the previous chapter, trade played an important role in transforming
Turkestan into a ―colony.‖ While the economic question may have been easily decided –
everyone wanted to make Turkestan profitable – but poorly implemented, the adjoining political
question was never resolved: should the Russians rule Turkestan with a civil administration? or
should they maintain a military autocracy? Should the Russians cultivate an elite class of local
cadres? or should they extirpate the last vestiges of native rule and appoint Russian officials to
conduct the daily affairs of the Turkestanis?
Such questions were highly divisive throughout Turkestan‘s brief fifty-year lifespan,
pitting hotheaded military generals against reform-minded civilian administrators. However, an
overemphasis on schisms and rifts elides the more mundane similarity between these ostensibly
antithetical camps: the shared idea that the Russians should, at the very least, make a good
impression amongst the Turkestanis. But what was a good impression? Did it mean that the
average Russian citizen should lead by example, exhibiting the care and diligence emblematic of
a life under the new order? Or, did it mean that the Russians should impress the Turkestanis,
bedaubing themselves in a panoply of imperial majesty complete with the pomp and splendor
afforded by the comforts of new Russian goods? Or, even further, did it mean that the lessons of
order had to be ―impressed‖ into the very bosom of every Turkestani via the brutal infliction of
bodily horror which characterized the slaughter of civilians at the Geok Teke massacre? Turning
to the actual settlers, did it mean that the Russians even had to be nice? moral? or tolerant? Or,
on the other hand, was discrimination and violence permissible as long as the settlers continued
to ―impress‖ their local neighbors with an aura of Russian wealth and might? Such questions
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bridged the gap between the military and civil administrators as both groups gave credence to the
idea of the right impression.
As I will show, this idea was based on an ethnographic knowledge of the Turkestanis.
According to administrators, it was a crucial component in cementing Russian rule in the region.
In the Russian imagination, the logic went as follows: because Turkestanis were foreign to ideas
of profit and commercial cooperation, they were unable to respond to modes of economic
pacification. Sergei Witte‘s strategy of the penetration pacifique would not hold in Turkestan.
The pre-modern Turkestanis could not be lulled into the colonial market through the gradual
construction of a civil society; instead, they had to be impressed.
This impression, already existing in a myriad of forms, reared its head during two distinct
periods of Turkestan‘s history: the initial conquest of the area and later, during the years of the
Governor Generalship. According to the controversial logic of General Mikhail Skobelev, the
idea of a peace treaty was completely foreign to the Turkestanis. Warfare could only conclude in
the region with a most sanguine impression: the killing of thousands of Turkestanis – a military
methodology which, Skobelev believed, colluded with Turkestani ideas of warfare and respect.
This idea is troubling: if anyone could claim to purport an anthropocentric approach to
the conquest of Turkestan, then it was Mikhail Skobelev. An avid believer in a distinctly
―Asiatic‖ approach to warfare, Skobelev envisioned the conquest of Turkestan as one which built
upon the traditions of the local population regarding combat and capitulation, not one which
deployed Russo-centric ideas of mercy and peace accords. However, insidious overtones lace
Skobelev‘s ethnography: or, can we really accept Skobelev‘s opinion of the impression as a
legitimate piece of knowledge when taking into consideration the overt trajectory of such
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knowledge? – i.e. the subjugation and slaughter of Turkestanis at the hands of the Russian
military. From the outset, it seems as if the impression is doomed to be an apology for Empire, a
pernicious lie which gave license to a bloody military conquest and the continued presence of
military personnel in the region.
Yet, there is another side of the story, one which plays out during the administration, not
conquest, of Turkestan. Some early twentieth-century commentators on Turkestan, amongst
them Count Konstantin Konstanovich Pahlen, elaborated on Skobelev‘s ideas of the impression:
if the Turkestanis, they argued, respond only to Russian military might, then they, in the years
following the conquest, will respond only to rulers who continue to produce a sense of grandeur.
Decadent clothing, champagne, lofty military titles – in Turkestan, the elegance of colonial life
in the 1890s supplanted the gory military assaults of the previous decade. The blood of the
military‘s impression became the flashy commodities of the administration‘s impressiveness.
Like the impression, the cultivation of impressiveness amongst Russian officials was
thought to build on local traditions. In the Russian imagination, Turkestani leaders ensured
loyalty amongst their subjects by inspiring awe. Khans and Emirs achieved this by deploying
symbols and rituals, not by developing a constituency of consenting citizens via the construction
of a civil society. As discussed in the previous chapter, the development of a fully modern
society in Turkestan was unsuccessful. In light of this, Russian administrators maintained
authority by building on the supposedly pre-modern ways in which the Turkestanis were
imagined to relate to their leaders. They developed their impressiveness by parading the products
of Russian manufacturers: symbols which sought to maintain the peace brought about by the
initial impression of the Geok Teke massacre.
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While the idea of making an impression justified the expansion of Empire, the necessity
of producing impressiveness promoted widespread administrative corruption. The idea was both
beneficial and detrimental to Russian interests in the region. Corruption was a serious force in
Turkestan, inspiring Count Konstantin Pahlen‘s official review of the region in 1910. Pahlen,
like fellow commentator A.K. Dobrosmyslov, issued a vituperative account of Russian
administrative practice in Turkestan. Both critics tarnished the reputation of several corrupt
administrators, and Pahlen even had the authority to dismiss several Russian officials from their
posts. In Turkestan, they found individuals who took the need for impressiveness as a license for
corruption and unabashed self-indulgence. Such administrators sought to impress the local
population by improving their material standing as well – a recipe for omnipresent corruption.
Accounts issued by Pahlen and Dobrosmyslov did not just result in the firing of
unscrupulous officials; it also prompted a rethinking of the logic upon which administrative
corruption was founded: the need to cultivate impressiveness amongst Turkestanis. This was a
move people such as Pahlen were not ready to make. Whereas he excoriated the administrative
corruption, he also extolled the idea of impressiveness upon which this very corruption was
based. It was not until anthropologist Vladimir Nalivkin‘s 1913 work Tuzemtsy ran’she i teper’
that Russian thinkers begin to challenge the necessity for forging an impression. Whereas the
Peace Society protested Skobelev‘s actions as inhumane, Nalivkin, turning to the bevy of
profligate administrators, challenged their self-indulgence not only on moral grounds, but on the
basis of false information. The local population, he attested, not only did not need to be
impressed, they also saw Russian attempts to do so as an immoral comedy.
The same knowledge which was effective in concluding the conquest of Geok Teke,
according to Nalivkin, proved ineffective in administering the territory. To Nalivkin, it is not just
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that corruption hinders the efficacy of the Russian bureaucracy; more so, it is this problem of an
immoral comedy, one which the Russians brazenly enacted in front of the Turkestanis. The idea
of the impression, then, not only hurt the Russian administration by legitimizing corruption, it
did so by producing a means for local resistance as well. Turkestanis were not just victims of
Imperial ethnographies, they transformed these ethnographic perceptions of their culture into
avenues for anti-colonial activity. In so doing they produced a counter-ethnography on Russians.
Nalivkin‘s critique of Skobelev, and, as we will see, Pahlen, opens up a space in which local
perceptions of the Russian population prove detrimental to the development of the Russian
colonial mission in the region; where the ethnographic rumors and conjectures of pre-modern
societies counter the institutionalized ethnographic research of modernized states; and where the
colonizer can look back on the colonized.
If one were to read just Skobelev, the score would be easy to settle: the idea of
impressing the Asians, a practice in outdated forms of cultural essentialism, leads directly to the
unmitigated slaughter of retreating Tekkes. But the point of this chapter is neither to prove nor to
disprove ethnographies, nor is the goal to invalidate those which dovetail with brutal repression
while lauding those which tout its opposite – peaceful, civil integration. By drawing on
Nalivkin‘s work, this chapter asserts the equality between the ethnographies of the colonizer and
those of the colonized: Russian knowledge of Turkestanis does not just beget Empire, and
Turkestani knowledge of Russians can thwart empire.
First, the Empire viewed ethnography as integral to the success of the colonization of
Turkestan. Having had little contact with the region before the mid-nineteenth century, the
Russian Empire sought to familiarize itself with the physical terrain and its inhabitants. Von
Kaufman pioneered these efforts. As Governor General, he surrounded himself with an
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entourage of anthropologists, scientists, and artists who sought to organize the terra incognita
that was Russian Turkestan. Von Kaufman commissioned the most comprehensive study of
Turkestani life of his time in the Turkestanskii Al’bom. Published in the 1850s and 60s, the
Turkestanskii Al’bom was a Russian encyclopedia of Turkestan, comprised of articles on the
region‘s archaeology, ethnography, economic practices, and military history. The Al’bom
contained a wide range of genres, including academic papers, photographs, architectural
blueprints, paintings, and maps. Artists, such as Vasilii Vereschagin, photographers, such as
N.N. Nekhoroshev, and orientalists, such as A.L. Kuhn, were all involved in the project. The
illumination of the terra incognita was a trans-disciplinary task.
The information presented in works such as the Turkestanskii Al’bom maintained a
connection to state power. Because Turkestan was a military colony, individuals who worked in
the territory had to apply for military clearance. Many of the professionals who were able to
travel in Turkestan were either already a part of the military or were there on the military‘s
ticket. And the knowledge they produced was meant to help the Russian army. Ethnographical
information would ensure the smooth operation of the state by allowing Russian administrators
to base their policies on solid knowledge of the local population. For instance, Von Kaufman‘s
notorious policy of ignorirovaniia with regard to Islam drew on such mid-nineteenth century
ethnographies. Other policies, such as taxation and border-delimitation also relied on this
information.
A.P. Fedchenko characterizes the spirit of the age: a master of several disciplines, he
approached human subjects like the physical environment. Having worked in the region as an
orologist, geologist, climatologist, botanist, and zoologist, Fedchenko turned to the different
ethnicities of Turkestan with the same goal of scientific exactitude in mind. He used phrenology
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to distinguish between the different ethnicities of Turkestan. Much was at stake in his work: were
the Sarts a distinct race? Were the Tajiks distinct from the Uzbeks? By answering questions such
as these, Fedchenko was complicit in aiding state formation in Turkestan. With knowledge of
ethnic differences, the Russians could ensure that they would not enact policies that would
inspire inter-ethnic warfare in Turkestan. Knowledge, to the state, engendered peaceful intertribal relations.
Not all ethnographies of Turkestan were conducted with such exactitude in mind, and not
all saw publication in journals such as the Turkestanskii Al’bom. Unprofessional ethnographies
spread throughout the Russian military. Despite their unofficial nature, these ethnographies were
just as pernicious in their depiction of Turkestanis. Such ethnographies were also connected to
imperial expansion. General Mikhail Skobelev‘s amateurish concept of ―making an impression‖
had as strong an impact on Russian military strength as Fedchenko‘s meticulous phrenologies.
His campaign against the Tekkes in 1880 demonstrates this. In late December 1880,
Russian forces successfully stormed the last in a line of Turkoman (Turkmen) forts, Geok Tepe,
thereby concluding both the month-long military operation in the Akhal Teke as well as the
twenty-five year conquest of Russian Turkestan. Marked by wanton cruelty by the Russian
troops, the battle levied a heavy toll against the Turkomans. While over twelve thousand
died during the battle, another eight thousand died in retreat. Head General Mikhail Skobelev,
upon hearing of the Tekke retreat, ordered a division of Cossacks to pursue and slaughter them.
The ensuing attack was abhorrent in its indiscriminate slaughter of women and men, noncombatants and combatants. Skobelev was notoriously unapologetic for the attack, flouting the
charges of his detractors publicly – here, in an interview with a British journalist:
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Do you know Mr. Marvin, but you must not publish this, or I shall be called a barbarian
by the Peace Society – that I hold it as a principle in Asia that the duration of peace is in
direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy. The harder you hit them the
longer they will be quiet afterwards. We killed nearly 20,000 Turcoman at Geok Tepe.
The survivors will not soon forget the lesson.103
Having openly challenged the Russian military in Akhal Teke, the Tekkes did not simply deserve
to be killed. In Skobelev's mind, they needed it.

Peace, in his above-quoted formulation, would come to the Tekkes only via the killing of
their population. Skobelev would later come to characterize this as Asiatic warfare. Having lead
troops in both the Balkans and Central Asia, Skobelev drew on his experience in order to
establish different codes of military conduct for battle against Europeans and Asians. Trenches,
calculation, temerity, and rationality should govern military strategy against
Europeans; swiftness, courage, bravery, honor, and cruelty should govern military strategy
against Asians.

At Geok Teke, Skobelev called on his principle of Asiatic warfare to justify military
tactics that defied pragmatics. The killing of fleeing Tekkes required the further endangerment of
Russian troops and was not necessary in concluding the battle. At other times, Asiatic warfare
vindicated tactics that were viable otherwise: for instance, the use of dynamite. Having
approached the outer wall of the Geok Teke fortress, Skobelev determined that the Russian
military would have to fell the wall in order to open the fortress to a Russian attack. The Russian
military possessed the technology to do so, and the decision on Skobelev‘s part was not
malicious like the decision to pursue and kill the eight thousand Tekkes. Yet, he persisted in
explaining the use of dynamite via the rationale of Asiatic warfare. The dynamite would have
Ol‘ga Alekseevna Novikova, Skobelev and the Slavonic Cause (London: Longmans, Green, and Co.,
1883) 213.
103
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significance beyond the wall; it would leave a resonating impression amongst the Tekkes.
Present at Geok Teke, military journalist A. Maslov quotes Skobelev on his decision to use
dynamite on the Teke fortress. The general ―could only imagine the impression that the
explosion would leave on the savage defenders of the fortress.‖104

However, Asiatic warfare was not just a strategy for humiliated military generals to
recover the glory that they had lost in Europe during the Crimean War. For instance, Mikhail
Cherniaev, appealed to ―Asian‖ codes of respect and reverence in an effort to maintain military
control over the region. This oftentimes overruled the perceived concessions and power politics
of the Tsar. The tension between those in Petersburg and those in Turkestan has already been
discussed above, but the point here is that those who were closer – in this case, Cherniaev –
bolstered their credibility by appealing to local customs. Fifteen years before the Geok Teke
massacre, Orenburg Governor General Kryzhanovsky relieved Cherniaev of his duties. In
February 1866, Cherniaev had refused to remove his troops from Bukhara. In so doing, he
violated a promised treaty condition and interfered with negotiations between Tsarist officials
and the Bukharan Emir. Retreating, in Cherniaev‘s view, would evince weakness in the eyes of
the Bukharans – a weakness which, in effect, would ultimately jeopardize stability in the region.

An excuse for slaughter and a permanent military occupation of the region, the
impression of Skobelev and Cherniaev hearkened to Asian codes of honor which lent their
opinions credence in the face of supposedly Russo-centric Tsarist administrators who preached
prudence and peace in Central Asia – concepts which, in the military‘s imagination, belonged
more in the drawing rooms of European polite society than on the battlefields of Turkestan.
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In order to rule the Asians Russian military generals believed that it was important to
brutally punish the local population on the battlefield and to maintain a military presence in the
region. Removing the military in favor of a civil administration would only exacerbate RussianTurkestani relations. The right impression begins to sound like oppression, and may even begin
to liken the conquest of Turkestan to the Empire‘s military expeditions in Europe as well. The
Poles, for instance, received a similar treatment. But the logic of the impression had a distinct
fate in Turkestan. Skobelev‘s idea of impressing the Asians as well as Cherniaev‘s respect did
not remain in the hands of the military, nor did it flow unidirectionally. The Russian military did
not just fabricate a myth of Asian society in order to rationalize a brutal military autocracy which
circumscribed the autonomy of Turkestanis. The idea traveled into the hands of corrupt
administrators as well. There, the idea of creating an impression did not bolster, but damaged the
Russian image in the region. While the military used the idea of the impression to brutally curtail
all local dissent, the administration‘s deployment of the ethnography engendered unrest amongst
the population.

Count Konstantin Konstantinovich Pahlen gave a first-hand account of this corruption. A
member of an aristocratic German family, Pahlen was part of the Tsar‘s inner circle. In 1908,
Nicholas II commissioned him to investigate allegations of fraud levied against Russian
administrators in Turkestan. Once there, Pahlen not only uncovered pandemic corruption, he
prosecuted offenders as well, relieving several officers of their duty. These cases were recorded
in a report issued by Pahlen in 1910; however, it is the Count‘s memoirs which capture the sense
of betrayal which Pahlen felt – what he perceived to be the seedy undermining of an otherwise
worthy cause.
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Pahlen characterizes the Russian expansion into Turkestan as the triumph of European
culture over Asiatic despotism. The ―great prestige,‖ writes Pahlen, ―enjoyed by all Russians
over Asia at the end of the nineteenth century‖105 was undoubtedly a result of that land‘s
transformation into ―something akin to Paradise.‖106 Here, freedom triumphed over slavery;
democratic elections, particularly of the judiciary, over rule-by-tradition; the reform of taxation
over the tyranny of the Emir‘s money-grubbing taxmen; ethical justice over prejudiced
adjudications; work over sloth; and the right of the individual to recognition over the
indistinguishable masses of nomadic tribes.107 However, the land ―akin to Paradise‖ was
administered by individuals who did not exemplify all of Pahlen‘s above-listed qualities.

A.K. Dobrosmyslov, in his 1912 work, Tashkent v proshlom, calls these individuals out
by name: Andrei Ivanovich Gomzan (officer from August 1856-67) was completely ignorant of
all legal affairs and was heavily involved in the prostitution business; Kablukov, who was forced
to resign because of his brother‘s tax evasions in St. Petersburg, drank too much, was lazy, and
was personally involved in ―temnye dela‖; and Colonel Ivan Gust, whose exact details remain
unnamed, was sent to Siberia for embezzlement. 108 Dobrosmyslov does not stop with the
officers. He castigates government departments as well: the officers involved in licensing private
land purchases solicited bribes from local engineers for building materials;109 workers in the post
office skimmed off the top, requiring additional fees for their services;110 and the customs
agency, established in 1890, maintained noticeable gaps in their supervision, allowing the
105
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transportation of contraband in and out of the protectorates.111 And if officers were not corrupt,
then they were inept. Dobrosmyslov criticizes the military personnel for being ignorant: the land,
forest, and irrigation committees were run by untrained military men, not experts in those
respective fields.112 Aside from special training, the general education of such military men was
also suspect. Dobrosmyslov claims that many were alcoholics who not only lacked a college
education, but a high school education as well.113
Clearly underprepared, in Dobrosmyslov‘s account, and traitors of the cause, according to
Pahlen, the men in charge of Turkestan in the years following the conquest were not, however,
without any knowledge of the region. While Dobrosmyslov impugns them for lacking
specialized knowledge of what they were administering, he elides the fact that these men, thanks
to thinkers like Skobelev or Pahlen, knew exactly how to administer the region. They may not
have known much about what they were administering, but they knew how to conduct business.
Such officers knew that it was necessary to operate with an aura of impressiveness. Although
corruption and tax evasion undermined the sheen of a moral and rational Russian bureaucratic
apparatus in Turkestan, these methods provided their purveyors with an equally impressive sheen
– Pahlen‘s sense of ―great prestige.‖ It was a prestige which the locals, in the imagination of
these administrators, could respond to in a way that they could not respond to ideas of
unprejudiced justice, work, or European culture. Impressiveness was more akin to the ways in
which the locals understood their rulers; it was not a top-down implication on local ideas of how
life was to be conducted.
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Impressiveness was not just a false ethnography which solely benefited the corrupt
Russian administrators in the region. Turkestani leaders benefited as well. Faced with protests
from British officers in India, the Turkestan Governor General consistently engaged in the
diminution and aggrandizement of various local leaders in an attempt to either put pressure on or
decrease hostility with their colonial neighbors. If the Russian government, in British eyes,
evinced expansionist aspirations, then the Governor General – with orders from St. Petersburg –
would downplay Russian control in the region by increasing levels of local autonomy. This was
done by decreasing the visibility of the Governor General and increasing the visibility, rank, and
prominence of the local rulers. Conversely, if the Russian government felt the urge to test the
British, or if the military simply felt the need to assert itself – usually in the face of a perceived
pan-Islamic threat, then it would demote the local leaders and reinstate the authority of the
Governor General. Pahlen discusses this in a passage on the Emir of Bukhara in 1908:
A very able diplomat, the Emir frequently visited St. Petersburg, where he was received
at court by the Emperor with all the honours due to the ruler of an independent state. A
judicious distribution of diamonds, decorations, and other bounties generally resulted in
some form of material advantage to Bukhara. At first the Emir had been placated by
decorations, but when he had collected all the stars that Russia could bestow upon him,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to resort to other marks of distinction. A start was
made by progressively adding to the grandeur of his title. General Kaufman, when
dealing with the Emir, had addressed him as ‗Sir,‘ (Vashe Stepenstvo); after one of the
Emir‘s journeys to the capital this was raised to ‗Honourable Sir‘, and subsequently to
‗Count,‘ ‗Excellency‘, ‗High Excellency‘ and finally to ‗Highness‘. In the eyes of the
natives he now ranked higher than the Governor. […] The local population of Turkestan
no longer had any doubts but that he outranked the Governor-General in Tashkent and
could do as he pleased in Bukhara. 114

But the Emir, having lost his ability to control his state's external affairs, was certainly not the
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"ruler of an independent state." Accruing all the trappings of such a ruler, the Emir recuperated
his lost authority symbolically: the Emir, in the Russian imagination, at the very least appeared
to be a sovereign. And, adorned by all the diamonds, titles, and grandeur that the Russians could
muster, the Emir, in the eyes of the local population, may as well have been the leader of an
independent state.
While the shuffling between the Governor General and the Emir had very little pragmatic
effect – the Governor General never actually relinquished his control over the region – the
symbolic implications were, in the Russian imagination, palpable. In the eyes of civil
administrators, the construction of this authoritative halo was the only way to ensure authority:
In the eyes of the people, our current civil officers (we are not yet discussing the
Generalship) – combat officers, accidently, and only by necessity, transformed into
administrators who then procured relatively wide power – presented themselves as the
direct deputies of the bek or the khalim of the Khanate era – rulers who were surrounded
in a halo of grand authority power and before the people. And this halo, in the course of a
few years, served those civil officers quite well: the population, for centuries accustomed
to or, more likely, trained by the Khanate government to respect only crude force, were
afraid of the civil administration.115
In addition to painting halos around local leaders, Russian civil and military administrators
donned these halos themselves, but to different effects. If St. Petersburg benefited by ordering
the development of the Emir‘s halo, then the aura of authority which local administrators created
damaged the Empire‘s civilizing mission in Turkestan.
While local leaders accrued military titles, local administrators accrued wealth. The Emir
wore the interminably increasing garments of higher and higher military ranks, but the midranking Russian administrators, themselves unable to acquire such titles as ―High Excellency‖ or
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―Honourable Sir,‖ created their halo from material glamour. This material construction of
authoritative halos produced resistance amongst the local population. Nalivkin shows this in his
analysis of perezhitki – individuals who survived the Russian conquest of Turkestan. Having lost
the military struggle, these perezhitki could continue to resist colonization by eschewing their
decadent possessions:
At the same time, those locals who were gradually brought under the auspices of Russian
law, having looked around amidst the new order and new conditions of life that had been
all but nonexistent in the earlier chaos, gradually began to purge their lives of all
unnecessary rubbish – things which, by their very essence, had already transformed into
something harmful and inimical, corrupting the body of the perezhitki. These people
began to simplify their lives by removing all expensive things, discarding items decorated
with silver, golden harnesses, velvet gloves; items which represented a pomposity that
supported and encouraged the Emirs of the Khanates.116
The perezhitki do not reject their ―new order and new conditions of life.‖ Instead of continuing
the fight against the Russians, they settle into their new lives. By throwing out ―unnecessary
rubbish,‖ Nalivkin‘s perezhitki do not throw out the Russian Imperial order. Instead, they discard
the ―pomposity that supported and encouraged the Emirs of the Khanates.‖ The military struggle
against the Empire has concluded, and the local population appears to have acquiesced,
jettisoning the last remnants of Emirate power – the ―silver, gold harnesses, and velvet gloves‖
that supported the regime.
However, the local population is not rejecting the Emir; instead, they are rejecting the
type of authority which the Russian administration sought to build upon: pomposity. The
perezhitki do not continue the military struggle against the Empire, but they do undermine the
basis of the Empire‘s power: the idea that leaders must impress their subjects. Far from passive
objects of imperial ethnographies, the local population of Turkestan was not just measured by
116

Nalivkin 94.

Thrasher 89
Fedchenko or impressed by Skobelev. Nor did they produce a counter ethnography of themselves
which attempted to counter the works of Fedchenko or Skobelev. Instead of arguing that they did
not relate to their rulers via impressiveness, a portion of the local population threw away their
expensive commodities. They were not interested in re-defining themselves in the face of
Russian ethnographies; nor were they interested in invalidating those ethnographies. Instead,
they permitted the Russians to maintain their views on Turkestani society. By doing so, they
created the conditions for a local counter-ethnography, one which saw the Russians as an
immoral, farcical society that swam in its own graft. They allowed themselves to resist, to turn
the ethnographic gaze back on the Russians.
In constructing their halos, Russian civil administrators created a means through which
the local population could clandestinely reject the Empire‘s civilizing mission. To Nalivkin,
corrupt administrators had created an impenetrable wall between themselves and the local
population. Russian administrators could not see what stood on the other side:
We, concerned only with our personal interests and failing to observe the facts of local
life, continued above all to assert that it was necessary to produce an impression on the
half-civilized Asians in order to successfully rule them. We believed this could be done
by surrounding ourselves in shiny, fancy things, thereby, to our own fiscal advantage,
creating a wall around ourselves: the locals recognized our actions quite well for the
―immoral comedy‖ and ―ridiculous farce‖ that they were. […] They saw how we swam in
our filth like fish in water. 117
On one level, Nalivkin impugns such administrators for ―failing to observe the facts of local
life.‖ While the Russians were creating impressiveness, the local population was disposing of
their extravagant possessions. This was a fact of local life that was at odds with the
administrators‘ desire to protect personal interests. By extirpating these personal interests from
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ethnography, the Empire could produce a clear-eyed vision of the local people that would allow
the smooth operation of the regime.
However, Nalivkin‘s account is not just an attempt to re-establish state policy along
accurate ethnographic information. He is not only interested in correcting what he believes to be
a common misconception among Russian administers and military personnel. His work shows
the effects of this misconception. The Russians had not built a wall around themselves because
they had cut themselves off from the local population. Instead, they had a constructed a wall by
failing to view the detrimental effects of their impression ethnography on the Empire‘s
operations in the region. While the wall between the Russians and the local population was
impregnable to Russian eyes, the local population could, and did, see through it.
On the other side of this wall stood the emptiness of Russian authority in the region.
Russian authority attempted to harness symbols of modernity – flashy commodities, for instance
– in order to root the regime‘s legitimacy in a realm beyond Turkestan. The regime was thought
to operate with an impressive aura. As Nalivkin writes, this was not the case. Local eyes did not
stop on the Russians. The population of Turkestan did not just find the Russians to be farcical
actors in an immoral comedy of corruption and gaudy materialism. They found Russian authority
itself to be unfounded: ―Such actions [the creation of pomp] encouraged the higher local
authorities, imagining and asserting, often with very unmerciful goals, that the prestige of the
Russian power in the region can be held only on external appearance, on pomp.‖118 In Nalivkin‘s
description, Russian authority did not just use pomp; it became pomp.
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And the Russians did not believe this. But how could they? They could not see their
authority based solely on pomp. Turkestan was a series of substantive achievements for the
regime. New goods, courts, and the end of slavery, for instance, guaranteed the legitimacy of the
Russian regime. Pomp was an important tool in solidifying these achievements. As discussed
above, by cultivating a sense of impressiveness, Russian administrators thought they were
developing a sense of authority amongst the local population. Subjects of brutal ethnographies by
Skobelev and Fedchenko, the people of Turkestan turned the logic of the impression back on
itself. They did not re-create themselves with self-ethnographies; instead, they allowed the
Russians to continue to act along the lines of the impression. In so doing, the locals were able to
produce an ethnographic impression of the Russians: an immoral people. Such an ethnography
could only happen if they allowed the Russians to continue in their ways. It did not take the form
of a Turkestanskii Al’bom and was not conducted scientifically by someone such as Fedchenko.
It was a rumor spread among the local population that counted as knowledge of the Russian
colonists.
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Conclusion
This project has shown how the Russian Empire attempted to colonize Turkestan through
the eyes of administrative reformers. In the process, we have arrived at a picture of local
resistance which looks nothing like traditional forms of anti-colonial activity. This is not to say
that such forms of resistance did not occur in Turkestan – they were just not pertinent to the
goals of this project. Instead of the cholera riots, this project focuses on local infiltration of the
Russian judicial system; instead of organized raids, this project focuses on a local public culture
that eschewed Russian manufactures; and, instead of anti-draft protests, this project focuses on
local forms of knowledge that challenged Russian authority in the region. The goal of this
project was to show how the Turkestanis both reacted to Russians and acted against them – how
the local population actively integrated changes in the socio-economic environment into their
daily lives and, in so doing, maintained anti-colonial agency.
Such a view of local agency has its shortcomings. This project spends little time delving
into anthropological details of the people of Turkestan; very little is said about the practice of
Islam; and almost no documents written by Turkestanis are taken into consideration. How, then,
can there be a study of local resistance without an emphasis on local custom, religion, or
perspective? First, I do not have access to sources written by members of the local population on
the Russian Empire. And even I did, I would do not read in any of the languages of Turkestan.
All such accounts would have to have been written in Russian. However, this does not render the
project futile. Faced with such a dearth, this project reads its Russian primary sources against the
grain. In search of a local voice, this project reconstitutes it from the reports and ethnographies of
Russian administrators.
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Without Turkestanis who wrote against the changes in local court structures, I have found
professional witnesses who infiltrated the new courts and corrupted them; without Turkestanis
who wrote against the exploitation of the region‘s natural resources, I have found a surrogate
public sphere that maintained the supremacy of local manufactures over against their Russian
counterparts; and, without Turkestanis who rebuked Russians for producing false knowledge of
the region‘s inhabitants, I have found local forms of knowledge which worked in conjunction
with such knowledge in order to turn it against its purveyors. In so doing, this project paints a
picture of a colonized population that was not intractable, unable to be brought into modernity.
The local population was able to adapt to the new colonial order. As this project argues, such
adaptation does not constitute acquiescence or a loss of selfhood. Instead, it was a necessary
precursor for the projection of anti-colonial agency.

Thrasher 94
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Dobrosmyslov, A.K. ―Pravitelstvennaya i obshestvenniya uchrezhdeniya.‖ Tashkent v proshlom
i nastoyashm: istoricheskii ocherkii. vol. 4. Tashkent, 1912.
Dostoevsky, Fyodor. A Writer‘s Diary. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993.
Fedchenko, A.P. Putishestvie v Turkestan (1888). Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo
geograficheskoy literaturi, 1950.
―Istoricheskii ocherk: rasprostraneniia Russkoi vlasti v Srednei Azii.‖ January 1884.
Kazi Bek,Yuri. ―Agtyarnckii volosnoi upravitel‘.‖ Vokrug sveta. No. 36. 1895. 574-5.
— ―Bacha, Sartskii pliacun‘‘.‖ Vokrug sveta. No. 40. 1895. 638-9.
— ―Narodnyi sud v Fergan‘.‖ Vokrug sveta. No. 41. 1895. 654-55.
— ―Gaib-Namaz u Magometan-Sartov.‖ Vokrug sveta. No. 47. 744-45.
Kvitka, A. ―Poezdka v Akhal‘-Teke.‖ Ruskkie vedomosti. No. 6. pt. I, II. 1883 (258-291; 575605).
Likoshin, N.C. Pol‘ zhizni v Turkesetan‘‘. Komissioner voenno-uchebnykh zavedenii: Saint
Petersburg, 1916.
Maev, Nikolai. Materialny dlia ctatistiki Turkestanskogo Kraia. Saint Petersburg: Izdanie
Turkestanskovo statistikoi kompaniia, 1876.
Maslov, A.N. Zavoevanie Akhal‘‘-Teke: ocherki iz posledni ekspeditsi Skobeleva (1880-1881).
Saint Petersburg: Izdanie A.S. Suvorina, 1882.
Nalivkin, V. P. Tuzemtsi: ran‘she i teper‘. Izdanie A.L. Kirsnera: Tashkent, 1913.
Pahlen, Konstantin Kontantinovich. Mission to Turkestan, Being the Memoirs of Count K.K.
Pahlen, 1908-1909. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
Pyatkovskii, A.P. ―Ocherkii Sredni Azii.‖ Nabludatel. Vol. 18. No. 8 (August). Saint Petersburg:
1899.
Valikhanov, Ch. Ch. and M. Veniukov. The Russians in Central Asia. Mansfield Centre, CT:
Martino Pub, 2006.
Valuev, P.A. Dnivnik P.A. Valueva. Moscow: Izdatel‘stvo akademii nauk, 1961.

Thrasher 95
Veniukov, Mikhail. Rossiia i vostok. Saint Petersburg: 1877.

Secondary Sources
Alatas, Hussein,. The Myth of the Lazy Native : A Study of the Image of the Malays, Filipinos
and Javanese from the 16th to the 20th Century and its Function in the Ideology of
Colonial Capitalism. London: F. Cass, 1977.
Amanat, Abbas and Frank Griffel eds. Shari‘a: Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.
Bassin, Mark. "Russia Between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical
Space." Slavic Review. v. 50, 1. Spring 1991, pp. 1-17.
Becker, Seymour. Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.
— "Russia between East and West: the Intelligentsia, Russian National Identity and the
Asian Borderlands", Central Asian Survey 10 (1991):4
Brower, Daniel R. Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire. London; New
York: Routeledge Curzon, 2003.
— Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1997.
Burbank, Jane, Mark Von Hagen, and A.V. Remnev, eds. Russian Empire: Space, People,
Power, 1700-1930. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.
— ―Revisioning Imperial Russia.‖ Slavic Review. Vol. 52, No. 3 (1993).
— Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1998.
Chatterjee, Partha. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
Clowes, Edith W., Samuel D. Kassow, and James L. West, eds. Between Tsar and People:
Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.
Cooper, Frederick and Ann Laura Stoler, eds. Tension of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a
Bourgeois World. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997.

Thrasher 96
Crews, Robert D. For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Curzon, George. Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question. New York:
Barnes & Noble, 1967.
Donnelly, Alton. ―The Mobile Steppe Frontier.‖ Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917. ed.
Michael Rywkin. London: Mansell, 1988.
Ehrenberg, John. Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea. New York: New York
University Press, 1999.
Evtuhov, Catherine, ed. Kazan, Moscow, St. Petersburg: Multiple Faces of the Russian Empire.
Moscow: O.G.I., 1997.
Galuzo, P.G. Turkestan-Koloniia. Tashkent: 1935.
Geraci, Robert P. Window on the East : National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001.
Gerasimov, Il‘ia. Novaia Imperskaia Istoriia Postsovetskogo Prostranstva. Kazan: TSentr
issledovanii natsionalizma i imperii, 2004.
Gorshenina, Svetlana. The Private Collections of Russian Turkestan in the Second Half of the
19th and Early 20th Century. ANOR, 15. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2004.
Guha, Ranajit and Gayatri Spivak, eds. Selected Subaltern Studies. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988.
Hauner, Milan. What is Asia to Us?: Russia's Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today. Boston:
Unwin Hyman, 1990.
Hopkirk, Peter. The Great Game : The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. New York:
Kodansha International, 1992.
Kappeler, Andreas. The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History. Harlow: Longman, 2001.
Kuran, Timur. Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004.
Lantzeff, George F. and Richard A. Pierce. Eastward to Empire: Exploration and Conquest on
the Russian Open Frontier to 1750. Montreal: McGill-Queen‘s University Press, 1973.
Lieven, Dominic. Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2001.

Thrasher 97
Lotman, Iurii. "The Decembrist in Daily Life." The Semiotics of Russian Cultural History:
Essays. Iuri Lotman, ed. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985.
Mackenzie, David. ―Kaufman of Turkestan: An Assessment of His Administration (18671881).‖ Slavic Review. Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1967): 267.
Maksheev, A. I. Istoricheskii Obzor Turkestana i nastupatel‘nago Dvizheniia v Nego Russkikh.
Bishkek?: s.n., 2006.
Malik, Hafeez. Central Asia : Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects. New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1994.
Martin, Virginia. Law and Custom in the Steppe: The Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Russian
Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century. Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon, 2001.
Novikova, Ol‘ga Alekseevna. Skobelev and the Slavonic Cause. London: Longmans, Green, and
Co., 1883.

Owen, Roger, and Robert B. Sutcliffe . Studies in the Theory of Imperialism;. [London]:
Longman, 1972.
Pierce, Richard A. Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917; a Study in Colonial Rule. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1960.
Sahadeo, Jeff. Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent: 1865-1923. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 2007.
— and Russell G. Zanca. Everyday Life in Central Asia : Past and Present. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2007.
Sanders, Thomas. Historiography of Imperial Russia: The Profession and Writing of History in a
Multinational State. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
Schonle, Andreas. The Ruler in the Garden: Politics and Landscape Design in Imperial Russia.
Oxford; New York: Peter Lang Pub Inc., 2007.
Scott, James. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1985.
Semmel, Bernard. The Liberal Ideal and the Demons of Empire : Theories of Imperialism from
Adam Smith to Lenin. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.
Spivak, Gayatri. "Can the Subaltern Speak?" Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1988.

Thrasher 98
Sunderland, William. Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.
Van der Oye, David Schimmelpenninck. Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire
and the Path to War with Japan. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001.
Vikor, Knut S. Between God and the Sultan: a History of Islamic Law. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005.
Wcislo, Francis William. Reforming Rural Russia: State, Local Society, and National Politics,
1855-1914. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Weeks, Theodore. Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on
the Western Frontier, 1863-1914. Dekalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996.
Yaroshevski, Don. ―Russian Regionalism in Turkestan.‖ Slavic and East European Review. Vol.
65, No. 1 (1987):81

